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The words ‘victim’ and ‘victimhood’ are familiar to us all. They are widely used, 
and widely understood, but does that mean we all agree on what they mean, or 
how they should be used? Why do some seek out recognition as a victim, while 
others deny their victimhood? The aims of this thesis are: i) to demonstrate and 
discuss the existing inconsistencies in discussions about victimhood and 
attitudes towards victims, and to identify the root of these inconsistent attitudes 
by examining the complexities of the concept of victimhood, ii) to evidence the 
link between different approaches to victims, and the amount of power an 
individual recognised as a ‘victim’ experiences as a result, iii) to discuss the issue 
of victim blame, and iv) to identify a way to enable and facilitate the possibility of 
critical analysis of the actions and behaviours which may leave us more 
vulnerable to harm, without transferring the blame from perpetrators to victims.  
I examine the power dynamics which surround victimhood in respect of 
three roles; the victim themselves, the perpetrator of harm, and the wider 
member(s) of society who bestow a person’s victimhood. This comparison is 
undertaken using the ‘Victim-Power Triangle’ model, which I have formulated in 
order to evaluate and analyse the power dynamics between these three roles, 
with particular focus upon each individual’s ability to achieve their intended 
effects with their speech. As I demonstrate throughout, there are occasions 
where recognition as a ‘victim’ can result in an individual becoming over-
empowered, and there are cases where recognition as a ‘victim’ can disempower.  
To avoid over-empowerment or disempowerment, I propose that the aim 
of victim recognition should be empowerment for the victim, and fair treatment for 
all parties involved, and that this aim can be achieved through a compassionate 
approach to victimhood, which recognises two main premises: we are all dignified 
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The reality of our existence means that at all times we are at risk of suffering 
some level of harm, and it is very likely that at some point we already have. If 
being subject to harm is the definition of victimhood, then the majority of people 
could lay at least some tentative claim to victim status. However, it is generally 
accepted that some level of harm is to be expected as part of living our lives. We 
are all likely to suffer a headache from time to time, to lose a loved one, or to face 
some form of injustice. While most of us recognise that we have experienced 
harm, we do not all consider ourselves to be a ‘victim’ of that experience. There 
appears to be some indeterminable threshold where the accepted and perhaps 
even expected level of harm crosses into a level that we consider beyond the 
ordinary, and which therefore renders the subject a ‘victim’.  
If we compare the level of harm we accept with the harms suffered by 
someone we would acknowledge as a ‘victim’, for example someone who has 
been subject to a violent crime, it seems that one clear difference is whether the 
harm experienced is pervasive in nature, and continues to have an ongoing 
impact upon a person’s life or behaviour beyond the time of the original event.  
The state of victimhood has been explored across many disciplines, and 
in fact, victimology became an academic pursuit in its own right in the 1940s 
(Walklate, 2013). However, much of what has been written becomes ever more 
relevant, and takes on a renewed significance, in the wake of what has been 
coined the “#MeToo” era.  
With acknowledgement of victimhood comes sympathy (Minow, 1993), 
support, and sometimes even power (Williams, 2008; Minow, 1993; Weeks and 
Johnson, 1980). Many have written about the power associated with victim 
status, and the potential dangers of this power. One of the prevailing difficulties 
around recognition of victimhood is its often unverifiable nature. Not only it is not 
always possible to verify whether someone truly has experienced the harm they 
claim, but perhaps more difficult to verify is the true extent to which this harm has 
affected and continues to impact other aspects of their life, and even their 
behaviour – whether the harm crosses our invisible threshold and constitutes 
victimhood.  
Western society is increasingly facing charges of becoming a “victimhood 
culture”, in which people emphasise their claim to victimhood, and even engage 
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in “competitive victimhood” (Campbell and Manning, 2014: 711). Campbell and 
Manning go on to claim that “advertising one’s victimization becomes an 
increasingly reliable way to attract attention and support”, while Ofer Zur (2008: 
20) declares, “Today it is fashionable to be a victim.” 
 When the so-called “#MeToo” movement came bursting into the media in 
2017, the question of where we individually and jointly set the ‘victim’ threshold 
became an issue for every member of society. As story after story filled the 
headlines, the lack of consensus around definitions for sexual assault, harm and 
victimhood became clear, and the topic of heated debates. While some 
accusations clearly reported a criminal offence, such as accusations of rape, 
debates were sparked about conclusions being reached without evidence or legal 
process. Other accusations invited arguments about what actions actually 
constituted sexual assault, “Rape is a crime. But trying to pick up someone, 
however persistently or clumsily, is not” wrote the authors of an ‘open letter’, 
where they criticised the #MeToo movement for in turn making victims of men 
“[whose] only crime was to touch a woman's knee, try to steal a kiss, talk about 
"intimate" things during a work meal, or send sexually-charged messages to 
women who did not return their interest” (Chiche et al., 2018). 
 The potential power of a claim to victimhood in a society awakened by the 
#MeToo movement has been a concern of noted feminist philosopher, Judith 
Butler, whose friend and fellow philosophy professor, Avital Ronell, was accused 
of sexual harassment by a former student in 2018 (Gessen, 2018). Butler (2018; 
cited in Gessen, 2018: Paragraph 27) wrote, “My worry, though, is that in public 
culture right now an allegation of sexual harassment can be immediately taken to 
be the proof of the claim. Since women complainants, in particular, have been 
conventionally disbelieved and discredited, the trend is now reversed so that 
whoever speaks is assumed to speak the truth. Legal procedures ... are 
sometimes sidestepped altogether as the media becomes the new public 
tribunal.” 
 The criticism that the #MeToo movement bypasses normal legal 
processes expected following an accusation of a crime is one that can be found 
in comments made here and there in the media, but is interestingly harder to 
identify in formal literature. There seems to be an attitude that there exists a 
complete dichotomy; either one is fully in support of the movement, or one is 
against it. Those who point out any potential issues that arise from the automatic 
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belief and support of any person who makes an accusation are quickly met with 
condemnation. Authors of the open letter opposing the #MeToo movement wrote, 
“the women who refuse to fall into line are considered traitors, accomplices!” 
(Chiche et al., 2018: Paragraph 2). This backlash was felt by author Margaret 
Atwood (2018; cited in Conroy, 2018: Paragraph 6) when she questioned whether 
it was appropriate to assume that every woman who made an accusation was 
necessarily telling the truth, “To be clear, some women lie. Why not? They’re 
human beings. That doesn’t invalidate any of what we’ve been hearing. If you 
take the false position that no woman ever lies, you’re just going to be shot out 
of the sky pretty soon.” 
 While the #MeToo movement has been viewed as an important shift in the 
dynamics of truth-telling and gender (Gilmore, 2017), the assumption that any 
person who comes forward to make an accusation is necessarily giving a full and 
honest account of an event is clearly not logical. Those who continue to 
perpetuate this view as the basis for change could be seen to be jeopardising the 
ongoing success of the movement, because if just one prominent case is proven 
to be based on a false allegation, suddenly the entire movement can be 
questioned.  
Equally, accusations that the #MeToo movement sidesteps the judicial 
process need to be addressed. If the movement is seen by some groups to be 
bypassing fair process, and “summarily and indiscriminately lynching the accused 
without fair trial” (Pipyrou, 2018: 417), it is unlikely to be sustainable, or have a 
lasting impact. As Minow (1993: 1413) stated, “uncritical acceptance of victim 
rhetoric can derail political efforts to challenge oppression.” Moreover, those who 
advocate in favour of believing and recognising every person who comes forward 
to report as a victim will face a dilemma when those who start claiming victim 
status are the accused themselves.  
It is not only with regard to the #MeToo movement that the power of those 
claiming victim status is causing concern. In the UK, there is an ongoing debate, 
represented most clearly in the literature between Sir Richard Henriques, and 
Chief Constable Simon Bailey, about at what stage a person making an 
accusation should be called a ‘victim’. This debate, and the #MeToo movement, 
will be explored in greater detail throughout the dissertation.  
 The potential power of acquiring recognition as a victim has also been 
explored from the angle of psychotherapy by writers such as Wendy Kaminer 
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(1992), who pointed out that there is often a temptation in these reflective 
practises and in some fields of therapy to identify everyone as a victim. Since 
none of us will have lived unblemished lives, we will have each experienced some 
degree of harm. In a society focussed on self-help, we can be encouraged to 
draw on these experiences to claim victim status, and we can then seek to 
provide a defence for any of our own negative or harmful traits or behaviours that 
we may wish to detach from ourselves.  
These ideas appear increasingly relevant in today’s society, where there 
has been an increased focus on the importance of wellbeing and mental health 
in recent years. Thus, there is increased reflection and examination of past 
experiences to find explanations for current feelings and behaviours.  
It can at times feel like we are being sold victim status, with such a 
cafeteria of pathologies being offered up that we cannot fail to find something we 
can stake a claim to. Once we have been granted or perhaps self-proclaimed our 
entitlement to victim status, we receive the benefits afforded to those recognised 
as victims; sympathy, attention, relief of responsibility, solidarity, and power 
(Minow, 1993; Campbell and Manning, 2014; Weeks and Johnson 1980).   
This almost universal claim to victimhood is problematic for a number of 
reasons. One major issue being that when this indeterminable threshold for harm 
or abuse becomes substantially lowered to include as many ‘victims’ as possible, 
it leaves little room for distinction from more serious harms, “Finding intimate 
violence everywhere trivialises and obscures important distinctions in gradations 
of harm” (Minow, 1993:1427). Kaminer (1992: 27) warns that this loss of 
distinction puts “being raped by your father” into the same class as “not getting 
help with your homework.”  
While those referenced up to now have written about the power in claiming 
victimhood, many academics have also noted the potential loss of power for 
those individuals who become recognised as ‘victims’. In fact, many reject the 
term ‘victim’ believing that to give someone this label suggests that there is 
something significant about the person the harm happened to, it “traps them in a 
specific moment” and “reduces their identification to that experience” (Hamber 
and Kulle, 2001: 10). Others believe the word ‘victim’ suggests someone passive 
and accepting (Dunne, 2005) or “someone with a weak physical constitution who 
passively suffers from severe long-term consequences” (Papendick and Bonher, 
2017: 2). Williams (2008: 79) describes victimhood as “to do with being done by, 
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of being pacified, of being made to suffer others' ill-will against one's will”. 
Because of these negative connotations, many victims prefer to be identified as 
a ‘survivor’. Using the word ‘survivor’ represents strength, resilience and 
suggests “an active role in facing one’s traumatic experience and recovery” 
(Williamson and Serna, 2017: 669). 
In May 2019, Dr Edith Eva Eger, otherwise known as ‘The ballerina of 
Auschwitz’, addressed an audience at the Institute for Management Development 
(IMD). Eger, a Holocaust survivor, told the crowd “I was victimized, but I am not 
a victim” (cited in IMD, 2019: Paragraph 2). In saying this, Eger clearly does not 
mean to deny that she was held prisoner in a concentration camp, rather, Eger 
expresses her refusal to let her experiences at Auschwitz define her. Although 
she was victimised, she wishes to be defined by more than the sum of those 
experiences.  
In June 2019, Kim Phuc Phan Thi, renowned as the young girl 
photographed suffering from the effects of napalm during the Vietnam war, said 
“I don't feel as though I'm a victim anymore” (cited in Kenosha News, 2019).  
Despite these statements, the experiences these two women have 
endured mean that they fit perfectly into the dictionary definition of ‘victim’; they 
are individuals who have been harmed as a result of a crime, accident, or other 
action or event, and these were significant and pervasive harms. Furthermore, 
neither Kim Phuc nor Eger would argue that they had not been harmed in this 
way; but for them there is something other about the word ‘victim’ from which they 
wish to disassociate.  
These views about the perceived negativity of labelling someone a ‘victim’ 
have become so widespread that in some cases it seems the word is not just 
avoided, but prohibited. Ehrenreich (2009: 10) describes how the word has 
become “proscribed”, considered to be full of self-pity, and “un-PC”.  
 Many feminist academics, particularly those writing about domestic abuse, 
point out that because of the perceived weakness associated with victimhood, a 
person’s victim status is often considered to render them less capable of making 
the best decision for their own safety, and the power to make decisions is often 
taken out of their hands. Legal prosecution policies referred to as ‘victimless’, ‘no-
drop’ or ‘mandatory’ prosecution, which have been adopted in nations such as 
Canada, the USA and the UK, mean that a victim’s view on whether to make a 
complaint or press charges against a perpetrator of domestic abuse is not the 
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deciding factor. This is considered by some to be representative of a “patriarchical 
notion that the state knows what is best for each individual woman, more than 
the woman knows for herself” (Dayton, 2003: 283). This argument will be 
explored in more detail later in the thesis.  
On reviewing the wealth of literature that has already been written on the 
subject of victimhood, and which recognises a link between power and 
victimhood, this thesis builds upon the existing work and consider the increased 
relevance of these discussions through the historical lens of the #MeToo era.  
 
Outline of dissertation 
 
I will begin in Section 1 by demonstrating the complexities of victimhood and the 
prevalence of ambiguity about meaning and use of the word ‘victim’. This first 
section will examine Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts, how the 
meaning of words can evolve, how meaning is often only discernible through 
examining the particular context in which words have been used, and how this is 
problematic in finding a consistent approach to victimhood.  
The second section of this dissertation will seek to demonstrate how 
applying the ‘victim’ label can result in placing the subject in a very powerful 
position, and consequently why some may consider recognition as a ‘victim’ as a 
desirable status.  
In contrast, the third section will then explore how, in particular scenarios, 
to be recognised as a ‘victim’ appears to result in having power and autonomy 
taken away, and what factors influence these contrasting outcomes.  
Having demonstrated that there are varying consequences of recognising 
an individual as a ‘victim’, Section 4 will focus on ‘victim-blaming’, fear of ‘victim-
blaming’, and the consequences this fear and avoidance has upon the potential 
for discussions about how to keep ourselves and others safe from harm.   
  I will conclude by proposing that a response to victimhood which focusses 
on compassion, a view advocated by Martha Nussbaum, goes some way towards 
offering a solution which will empower, rather than disempower or over-empower, 





This dissertation will focus on victims of interpersonal acts because the issues 
discussed are demonstrated most clearly in relation to interpersonal acts. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss which interpersonal acts 
constitute wrongdoing, and, in what circumstances a person should be 
considered a ‘victim’ from a moral perspective. As Nils Christie (2004: ii) said, 
“Crime is not a fixed concept and which acts are considered criminal varies 
historically and between societies”, and therefore which acts result in recognised 
harms is not fixed either.   
Throughout this dissertation I will give examples of the word ‘victim’ being 
used in different ways, with vastly differing consequences, which will serve to 
demonstrate that the concept is used differently by different groups. In many of 
these examples the disparity in the use and meaning of the word ‘victim’ has 
directly led to academic disagreements. The purpose of using these particular 
examples will be solely to demonstrate the existence of varying understandings 
of the word ‘victim’, and the diverse consequences of using this word. Therefore, 
my purpose is not to attempt to resolve these academic disputes – I address them 
only to evidence the existence of inconsistency. 
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Section 1: What does ‘victim’ mean? 
 
Before demonstrating the variety of understandings of the word ‘victim’, it is worth 
exploring how a word with a definition that appears to be so widely agreed, and 
so readily employed, can have such a range of understandings.  
The words we use are important. In ideal circumstances, we choose the 
words we use very carefully so that we have the best chance of conveying to our 
listener or interlocutor our exact meaning. Even the exchange of one word for a 
seemingly synonymous word can alter a statement completely.  
 Words are complex; beyond its most basic definition or ‘denotation’, a 
single word can carry with it a multitude of connotations. This means that two 
people could hear the same word and, while understanding a similar definition of 
that word, could interpret the meaning of the speaker in entirely different ways. 
This understanding of the connotation or second meaning of a word is dependent 
upon innumerable factors, for example, culture, religion, social status and gender.  
There are many words which seem to be loaded with connotations beyond 
their most basic definition. When these words are employed, their general 
meaning is usually clear for all to see, like the surface of an iceberg, but the 
various connotations of the word throughout society are hidden from view, and 
often, interlocutors do not recognise that they are there at all. This can be 
problematic for communication as often we do not anticipate, nor recognise when 
there can be different secondary understandings of a particular word. Hume 
(1748: §VIII) recognised the prevalence of this problem, even between 
philosophers, when he wrote of the discussions over liberty and necessity, “It 
might be reasonably expected in questions which have been canvassed and 
disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of science, and philosophy, 
that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among 
the disputants… [But] From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has long 
been kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is 
some ambiguity in the expression; and that disputants affix different ideas to the 
terms employed”. When only a broad definition of a word or concept is shared or 
acknowledged, it is possible for the individuals engaged in a discussion to appear 
to be in agreement, or disagreement, and talk as if on the same terms, but fail to 
properly communicate with one another.  
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In some instances, the connotations which a person or group of people 
associate with a word or concept become related with the primary meaning of the 
word to such an extent that it becomes conflated with the meaning of the word. 
An example of this phenomenon is ‘feminist’. I propose that the word ‘feminist’ is 
generally accepted to mean someone who thinks men and women should be 
treated equally, with equal rights and status. However, ‘feminist’ is also a word 
which carries with it a wide range of connotations, which are not found within the 
definition, but are for some people as closely associated with the concept as the 
definition itself.  
Researchers at YouGov, a global public opinion and data company, 
undertook a survey in March 2018 in which respondents were asked if they 
identified as feminists (Abraham, 2018). However, in order to test the 
connotations of the word ‘feminist’, researchers chose to formulate three versions 
of this question, and respondents would randomly be asked one of these three 
versions; 
 
1) Are you a feminist? 
2) One definition of a feminist is someone who thinks men and women should 
have equal rights and status in society, and be treated equally in every 
way. Are you a feminist? 
3) Do you think men and women should or should not have equal rights and 
status in society, and be treated equally in every way?  
 
Researchers found that across all of the seven countries where the question was 
asked, 80-91% of respondents asked question 3 said that they believe men and 
women should have equal rights and social status. When presented with question 
2, 42-70% of respondents identified as feminists. When respondents were asked 
only if they were a feminist, only between 8-40% said they were (Ibid.). 
 The researchers concluded that the results showed that people were 
hostile towards the word ‘feminist’ while actually “readily subscribing to the ideals 
the term represents” (Ibid.: Paragraph 9). This study demonstrates that there is 
something about the word ‘feminist’, some association or connotation which is 
not found in the definition of the word, which means that some people do not 
identify with the term. Despite these other concepts not being defined anywhere 
within the original concept, they have become so closely linked to the word that 
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they have become, for some, inextricable. Since these additional connotations 
have not been identified, we cannot assume that they are the same for every 
person, and therefore, when discussing feminism, it is possible that people may 
be talking past one another. Without knowing what these connotations are, 
however, we cannot be certain that the lack of identification with the word always 
arises from hostility. For instance, a person may subscribe to the idea of 
feminism, but may believe that a ‘feminist’ is someone who demonstrably 
campaigns for those views, rather than just subscribing to them. The hidden 
connotation for this person is that a feminist is an active campaigner, and while 
there is nothing in the definition which necessitates this, this connotation has 
become so closely linked with the concept that it is conflated with the definition.  
Scharff (2009: 9) describes how her self-identification as a feminist is often 
met with responses such as "But you don't look like a feminist". Such comments 
suggests that there is something about the essence of being a feminist which 
would result in a particular type of appearance, but clearly there is nothing to 
suggest that someone who believes in the equal treatment of men and women 
would have any particular appearance. 
There are some common negative connotations which have become 
conflated with the concept of feminism, such as feminists being man-hating and 
hairy-legged (Pollitt, 2003), bra-burners (Crossley, 2009), and having an unkempt 
appearance (Dyer and Hurd, 2018). These connotations have become so widely 
espoused that they are, for some, synonymous with feminism, and consequently 
women increasingly dis-identify with feminism, despite supporting feminist 
attitudes and values. However, others happily identify as feminists, unperturbed 
by accusations of misandry, for example, because they do not see any link 
between feminism and hating men.   
Attempts at discussions about feminism can misfire when interlocutors 
believe they are talking about the same concept but, as Hume (1748: §VIII) 
describes, “affix different ideas to the terms employed”.  
The same ambiguity seems to exist with the concept of victimhood, 
resulting in some individuals rejecting the ‘victim’ label, while others seem to 
proactively seek acknowledgment as a ‘victim’ “leapfrogging over each other, 
publicly competing for the status of victim” (Zur, 2008: 3). While some consider 
identification as a ‘victim’ as indicative of weakness, and in some cases even 
consider this label to be an insult, others crave the power they see as attached 
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to a claim to ‘victim’ status. Not only do these perspectives seem to disagree 
about what it means to be a ‘victim’, they suggest that at least two quite 
fundamentally contrary understandings exist about the nature of victimhood; 1) 
being recognised as a ‘victim’ results in depletion of power, 2) being recognised 
as a ‘victim’ results in accretion of power. 
As with ‘feminism’, it seems that the apparent disparity within society about 
the meaning of the word ‘victim’ may stem from a conflation of the definition and 
connotations of the word. Connotations linked with a word often come from a 
confusion between what something is and what something does. The 
connotations about feminism seem to stem from an assumption about what a 
feminist’s core beliefs or values are, or the implications of a feminist’s core beliefs 
and values. Truthfully, all that can be known about someone who says “I am a 
feminist” is that this person believes that men and women should be considered 
as equal, and should have equal rights. To assume any further knowledge about 
this individual is fallacious. There is nothing further within the word ‘feminist’ 
which can tell us anything about how this individual’s beliefs manifest, and how 
this person acts as a result of their beliefs.  
With regard to victimhood, if a ‘victim’ is identified, we learn nothing more 
about that individual beyond their having been harmed in some way, as a result 
of a crime, accident, or other action or event. To make a judgement about whether 
or not this same person is passive or proactive, weak or wilful, based solely on 
their victim status, would be an entirely erroneous assumption. 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2020: Paragraph 
1) defines victims as “persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered 
harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, or economic loss 
or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions 
that are in violation of criminal laws…including those laws proscribing abuses of 
power”. Fohring (2018: 152) argues that this definition is too neutral and falls 
short of the “near-ubiquitous” negative stereotypes about victims, who are often 
scorned, ridiculed and ostracized. But Fohring’s understanding of victimhood 
does not seem to align with those who argue that people desperately compete to 
demonstrate their claim to victimhood (Zur, 2008), and it is contrary to the positive 
reactions others have linked to victimhood, such as understanding, sympathy and 
power (Williams, 2008; Minow, 1993; Weeks and Johnson, 1980), and to what 
Christie (1986) describes as the benefits of victim status. 
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1.i. How meanings change 
 
Before further examining existing views about victimhood, it will be useful to try 
to understand how we can know what words mean, and how word meanings can, 
and do, change.  
Occasionally, we stumble across a scenario where the definition of a word 
actually changes because it has been used somewhat inaccurately within society 
over such a period of time that the understanding has become altered. Anne 
Curzan (2014), a Language Historian, gives the example of the word ‘nice’, which 
was historically defined as “silly, foolish, simple”.  According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (2020a), the word ‘nice’ originates from the Latin words ‘nescius’ 
meaning ‘ignorant’, and from ‘nescire’ meaning to ‘not know’. In current use, the 
word ‘nice’ is far more positive, and is used to represent pleasant things.  
This phenomenon is actually rather common, in fact, semantic change 
occurs so frequently that the various types of change have been given categories. 
In the example of the word ‘nice’, the meaning has moved from negative to 
positive, which is known as melioration, whereas, when the meaning of a word 
transforms from positive to negative, the term applied is pejoration (Hollman, 
2009). According to Hollmann (2009: 531), “There are many cases where older 
meanings happily coexist with newer ones”, a change of meaning does not 
always eradicate the previous meaning of a word. Hollmann provides the 
example of the word ‘screen’, which in more recent years usually refers to 
television or computer screen, while the previous definition, “a large wooden 
panel, used to shield off for example one part of a room” (Ibid.) still exists.  
Hollmann also provides the example of the word ‘gay’, which in modern 
society is often used to refer to homosexuality, but can also mean “cheerful” 
(Ibid.). The latter, older definition of ‘gay’ is less commonly used in recent years, 
but the two definitions are so dissimilar they are unlikely to cause much confusion 
between interlocutors.  
However, I suggest that words like ‘feminist’ and ‘victim’ appear to 
represent a quite unique form of change; these are examples of words where the 
definition seems only to have shifted for some groups, while the original meaning 
remains for other groups, and the various meanings seem to co-exist rather more 
unhappily, and often unnoticed. In these circumstances, certain connotations can 
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become so closely associated with a word that some members of society begin 
to recognise them as part of the definition, while the original definition still stands 
for other groups of people.  
With regard to victimhood, conflation between what a victim is, and what 
traits a victim may have, seems to be heavily influenced through the media. The 
idea of what a ‘victim’ looks like, how they behave, and what kind of person they 
are is often very narrow; and this narrow idea is reinforced by the victims who are 
brought to our attention in the media. The depiction of the victim of modern 
slavery in the media is a useful example, usually focussing on the impact upon 
women and children rather than men (Craig et al., 2019). This means that male 
victims are often overlooked: “awareness campaigns perpetuate a form of 
exclusion through the construction of a typical or 'ideal' victim of trafficking.” 
(O’Brien, 2013: 315). It also means that women are “lumped in with children as 
categories of person requiring special protection” (Davidson and Anderson, 2006: 
21). Advertising campaigns hoping to raise awareness of the issue often highlight 
the innocence and vulnerability of victims (Craig et al., 2019; O’Brien, 2013). 
O’Brien (2013: 316) points out that this view of victims often only results in a 
“significant hindrance to attempts to combat trafficking” because by 
“misrepresenting the nature of the problem” we overlook victims who don’t 
conform to this limited view.  
 
1.ii. Meaning as use 
 
The fact that the definition of a word can change over time reveals that meaning 
is dependent on use. Dictionaries often contain a range of definitions, including 
some historical uses, demonstrating that dictionary definitions reflect how a word 
is used rather than dictate how a word should be used. Curzan (2014) uses the 
example of the word ‘peruse’. The American Heritage Dictionary (AHD) (2020) 
gives two opposing definitions of the word, the first being “to read thoroughly”, 
and the second “to glance over, skim”. The AHD (Ibid.) also provides the following 
‘usage note’; “Peruse has long meant “to read thoroughly”…But the word is often 
used more loosely, to mean simply “to read”…Further extension of the word to 
mean “to glance over, skim” has traditionally been considered an error, but our 
ballot results suggest that it is becoming somewhat more acceptable. When 
asked about the sentence I only had a moment to peruse the manual quickly, 66 
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percent of the [Usage] Panel found it unacceptable in 1988, 58 percent in 1999, 
and 48 percent in 2011.” 
Curzan uses this example of the word ‘peruse’ to demonstrate that it is the 
people using a word who decide what it means.  
The word ‘literally’ is another example of a word which is so commonly 
used in a way that is contrary to the originally accepted definition, that the 
definition has shifted. In 2012, the former UK Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, 
said in a speech, “It makes people so incredibly angry when you are getting up 
early in the morning, working really hard …you are paying your taxes and then 
you see people literally in a different galaxy who are paying extraordinarily low 
rates of tax” (cited in Curtis, 2012). His use of the word ‘literally’ sparked a media 
debate, as it was clearly not Clegg’s intention to say that people were actually in 
different galaxies. But many social and political commentators came to Clegg’s 
defence, arguing that his use of the word was appropriate and reflected the 
common use of the word, and therefore the current meaning of the word; “Words 
only mean what people understand them to mean… the word has not meant 
solely "non-metaphorical" for centuries, if it ever really did” (Chivers, 2012: 
Paragraph 5).  
As with the word ‘peruse’, if enough members of society use a word to 
convey a particular meaning, and enough members of society recognise the word 
as having that meaning, then that becomes one recognised definition of that 
word. While peruse was originally defined as “to read thoroughly”, it was so 
commonly used to mean “to glance over, skim”, and most importantly, was 
recognised as having that meaning, that this was consequently acknowledged as 
an alternative definition.  
In ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Wittgenstein (1958: 20) said, “For 
a large class of cases–though not for all–in which we employ the word “meaning” 
it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language”. That is 
to say, to identify the meaning of a word we should look at how it is used, “Don’t 
think, but look!” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 31). Black (1974: 596) explains, 
“Wittgenstein is saying that in many cases, the term 'meaning', where the concern 
is with the definition (= explanation) of a word, can be defined as the use of the 
word in the language.” Lazarus (2011: 2) adds, “explaining the meaning of a word 
to children consists precisely in teaching them the use of a word”.  
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Essentially, we cannot and should not rely on the dictionary definition of a 
word to understand what the word means, or whether it is being used 
appropriately. The dictionary definition of a word is a reflection of its use, and 
dictionaries are guides that document use of a word over time, but to use a 
dictionary definition of a word to try to prevent or reverse a societal shift in the 
use of a word is to beg the question. Conant (1998: 239) writes, “‘for a large class’ 
of occasions of speaking there isn’t anything which can properly count as asking 
the question ‘What do the words [that have been spoken] mean?’ apart from a 
simultaneous consideration of questions such as, ‘When was it said?’, ‘Where?’, 
‘By whom?’, ‘To whom?’, etc.” 
We begin to see that the question of what the word ‘victim’ means, is not 
a simple one. It is not merely the case that there is one fixed meaning that certain 
groups of people have inaccurately moved away from, and to brand certain 
understandings as correct or incorrect would be inappropriate.   
One could go as far as to argue that to ask “what does ‘victim’ mean...?” 
is really only half of the question, and needs to be followed by the usage context 
which grounds the meaning of the word, “what does ‘victim’ mean when it is said 
by A, in situation B, at time C?”.  
 However, if we base our understanding of the meaning of a word in the 
context in which we hear it used, when it is used in a positive way, positive 
connotations will become attached, when it is used in a negative way, negative 
connotations will become attached. When it is repeatedly used in a negative way, 
for example, those same negative connotations may always be present, and 
eventually become conflated with the definition of the word. When the word is 
then used in a different context, the hearer is unable to properly ask the question, 
“what does this word mean when it is said by A, in situation B, at time C?”, 
because the very basic definition of the word has been lost to them, and the 
meaning becomes skewed. They are aware of only one way that this word has 
been used, and cannot on balance ask with which, of a range of usages, this 
current usage sits most closely.  
If the media only portrays victims as innocent and vulnerable, and 
subsequently the word is used only to describe people who have been harmed 
and who are apparently vulnerable and innocent, if innocence and vulnerability 
become an essential part of what it is to be a victim, then evidence which 
undermines the innocence or vulnerability of a person is also considered to be 
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evidence which undermines their victim status, while in reality having no 
relevance to the fact that they were subject to harm.  
 In November 2018, a lawyer representing the defendant in a rape trial in 
Ireland encouraged the jury to consider the underwear the alleged victim was 
wearing on the night of the incident, “Does the evidence out-rule the possibility 
that she was attracted to the defendant and was open to meeting someone and 
being with someone? You have to look at the way she was dressed. She was 
wearing a thong with a lace front” (cited in Heylin, 2018: Paragraph 17). In raising 
this issue, the lawyer conflated two very separate issues; 1) the question of 
whether the alleged victim consented to having sex, or was a victim of rape, and 
2) the question of whether she was dressed in such a way as to suggest she 
might be looking to meet someone for sex that evening.  
In truth, this argument fails on both levels. The type of underwear someone 
is wearing is not sufficient to tell us very much at all about a person, and is a very 
poor basis on which to form assumptions about whether a person is looking to 
have sex that evening. However, there is no link whatsoever between the type of 
underwear someone is wearing and whether or not they consented to sex.  
The lawyer’s aim seems to have been to convince the jury that the 
underwear the alleged victim was wearing was sufficient to suggest that this 
individual may have been open to having sex with a stranger. Although this 
suggestion would have no relevance at all in establishing that the alleged victim 
consented to having sex with the defendant, or whether she initially consented 
but then withdrew consent, establishing if there was consent does not seem to 
have been the lawyer’s intention. Instead, she hoped to undermine the claim to 
victim status by undermining the sexual innocence of the alleged victim, 
suggesting promiscuity, and appealing to the fact that for some groups of people 
purity and innocence have become inseparable from victim status, and that 
promiscuity is incompatible with victimhood.  
In this example, it appears that the lawyer hoped to blur the lines between 
what it is to be a ‘victim’ and what it is to be an ‘ideal victim’. Christie (1986: 18) 
has perhaps most notably defined the “ideal victim” as “a person or a category of 
individuals who - when hit by crime - most readily are given the complete and 
legitimate status of being a victim”. The ideal victim is usually a “young, innocent 
female out doing good deeds who is attacked by an unknown stranger” (Ibid.). 
Conflation between what it means to be a ‘victim’ and the concept of the ‘ideal 
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victim’ often means that those who do not meet the “Little Red Riding Hood” 
picture of victimhood may consequently not be considered victims at all 
(Walklate, 2007: 144). This is particularly applicable in crimes with a sexual 
element, such a rape. Often there are specific attributes for what the public will 
recognise as a ‘real’ or ‘legitimate’ rape victim (Estrich, 1987; Walklate, 2007); if 
the victim was not doing something which is considered “respectable”, if they 
wore revealing clothing, or acted in any way considered provocative, then the 
incident is instead perceived as a “regretted” sexual encounter (Bows, 2018: 
231). 
 
1.iii. What does ‘victim’ mean? How is ‘victim’ used? 
 
To summarise some of the uses of ‘victim’ seen thus far, despite the basic 
definition being neutral, there are some negative connotations; victims perceived 
as weak, vulnerable, passive (Davidson and Anderson, 2006) small, and worthy 
of scorn (Fohring, 2018). Contrastingly, there are also positive connotations, such 
as innocence and blamelessness (Christie, 1986), worthy of understanding and 
sympathy (Minow, 1993), and being in a powerful position (Williams, 2008). 
 Interestingly, research suggests that many victims themselves carry 
negative connotations of victim status, and while some will accept that their 
situation technically means they are ‘victims’, they shun the label. When Fohring 
(2018: 155) asked victims of crime what they felt about the label, the responses 
were “overwhelmingly negative”, although it was often acknowledged that it was 
not the true meaning of the word, but the connotations of the word that were 
negative:  
“I don’t think victim is a nice word ...I think you can have I don’t know wrong 
connotations sometimes you know, if you’re a victim then that makes you small, 
you’ve been trampled on or whatever and you could be trampled on again”.  
With these different conceptions of the essence of victimhood exposed, it 
becomes clearer why some people would push to be recognised as victims, while 
others will reject this recognition.   
The use and potential misuse of language, particularly concerning the 
word ‘victim’, has recently been highlighted as an issue within the British legal 
system. In 2016, Sir Richard Henriques, a retired High Court Judge, published 
an ‘Independent Review of the Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of non-
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recent sexual offence investigations alleged against persons of public 
prominence’. Henriques was asked by the Metropolitan Commissioner of Police, 
Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, to undertake the review of two high-profile 
investigations which had been undertaken by the Metropolitan Police, Operation 
Yewtree and Operation Midland. Operation Yewtree centred around allegations 
against television presenter Jimmy Savile, which were originally brought to light 
by ITV (television network) (Henriques, 2016). Operation Midland was an 
investigation centred on allegations of paedophilia, rape and murder reported to 
the Police by an individual who was originally given the alias of “Nick”, against a 
number of “very high profile individuals” (Ibid.: 4). After an extensive investigation 
had been carried out in respect of these accusations, it was discovered that “Nick” 
had fabricated the allegations, but because Nick’s allegations had been 
considered “credible and true” (Ibid.: 4) by officers when they were reported, the 
individuals he had named had been treated as suspects. In July 2019, “Nick” was 
convicted of 12 counts of perverting the course of justice and sentenced to 18 
years in prison (Crown Prosecution Service, 2019). 
For the purposes of his review, Henriques (2016) sought guidance from 
two publications, ‘Operation Hydrant SIO [Senior Investigating Officer] Guidance’, 
written by the Chief Constable of the Norfolk Police Constabulary, Simon Bailey, 
and the report of the ‘Independent Review into the Investigation and Prosecution 
of Rape in London’, which was chaired by the Rt. Hon Dame Elish. As a result of 
reviewing these texts, Henriques noted that the former report referred to the 
individual making a report of historic sexual abuse as “victim”, while the latter 
referred to these same individuals as “complainants”. Henriques felt that this was 
a discrepancy in the language which represented a significant issue, and one 
which required resolution.  
It was apparent that, although the two words are often used 
interchangeably in everyday policing (Beckley, 2018), the authors of the two 
reports were very clear that these words had two very separate meanings. 
However, not everyone who had read the recommendations presented by 
Angiolini in her report had properly recognised that the word “complainant” was 
different to “victim”, and Henriques (2016: 7) states, “In the MPS [Metropolitan 
Police Service] and CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] joint response to Dame 
Elish’s 46 recommendations, every recommendation is set out with the word 
‘complainant’ used, whilst the response invariably uses the word ‘victim’.” 
 24 
In a consequent report commissioned by the College of Policing, Assistant 
Commissioner Rob Beckley (2018: Paragraph 3.4) noted that many police 
investigators spoken to said that they thought “too much was being read into the 
word [victim]”.  
At this juncture, it is important to recognise that it may initially appear 
irrelevant or at most a minor issue if a person is referred to as a victim at the 
outset of an investigation, because the investigative and judicial process will 
continue regardless of the terminology used, and eventually a verdict will be 
reached in the traditional way, if it goes to trial. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that some police investigations are undertaken over many years before 
reaching court, while some cases will never reach court at all. For this reason, 
the language used during the investigative and any subsequent judicial process, 
and the impact this has, is not insignificant for any of the parties involved.  
When writing his report, Henriques (2016), recognising the significance of 
the dispute between use of “victim” vs “complainant”, concluded with a 
recommendation that an individual reporting a crime to the Police should be 
referred to as the “complainant” throughout the investigative and judicial process, 
up until the moment that there is a conviction. He justified this conclusion by 
claiming that “the entire judicial process, up to [the point of conviction], is engaged 
in determining whether or not a ‘complainant’ is indeed a ‘victim’ (Ibid.: 8). 
Henriques’ summation of the judicial process is inaccurate. The outcome 
of the judicial process is a determination on whether the individual accused of an 
unlawful act is guilty or not guilty, or more accurately, if there is sufficient evidence 
to show beyond reasonable doubt whether the accused is guilty or not guilty. The 
responsibility of a jury, after all, is to try the defendant, not the accuser (Ministry 
of Justice, 2020). It is easy enough to think of a hypothetical example where 
Police have identified a suspect, but in court there is insufficient evidence to prove 
they are guilty, or perhaps Police identified the wrong person, or were unable to 
identify a suspect at all. This does not negate the existence of the victim of that 
crime.  
In the UK, the word ‘victim’ is widely used throughout investigative and 
judicial proceedings, both by those involved in investigating, and by external 
agencies who provide support to victims. For example, the word ‘victim’ is used 
to refer to the person reporting a crime when the details are recorded on crime 
databases, and the Home Office Counting Rules for reporting crime use the word 
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‘victim’ in the same way (The UK Home Office, 2013). Those who report a crime 
will be offered the support of a Victim Support Officer. According to Henriques 
(2016: 9), “Every accused person that I interviewed expressed the view that by 
describing his accuser as a victim, his guilt had been assumed and thus pre-
judged”.  
 For Henriques then, the word ‘victim’ should only be introduced at the 
conclusion of the judicial process, where a guilty verdict has been recorded. 
Using this word before that stage acknowledges that the alleged harm has taken 
place, before it has been proven. Furthermore, applying the word ‘victim’ as a 
label to one individual can be said to have a simultaneous effect upon the 
accused; to refer to Y as ‘victim’ is to coincidentally comment upon the guilt of the 
accused. While this is of course not sufficient to count as the final verdict for those 
cases which will be heard in court, for the period before a court verdict is reached, 
or in cases which do not reach court, this effect is not inconsequential.  
Henriques argues that everyone involved in the investigative and judicial 
process should be completely impartial prior to the point of any potential 
conviction. By employing the word ‘complainant’ rather than ‘victim’, Henriques 
(2016: 13) believes impartiality can be achieved. In contrast, he proposes that 
employing the word ‘victim’ from the outset is a failure to be impartial, “Those who 
continue to contend for the use of the word are seeking to gain an advantage for 
complainants at the expense of those accused.” Achieving victim status, by these 
standards, is not simply having been subject to harm, but being able to prove you 
have been subject to harm.1  
Again, we can see the potential for communication to misfire as the 
disputants in this argument affix different ideas to the word ‘victim’. Henriques is 
describing a victim in the eyes of the law, but does not distinguish this from other 
types of ‘victim’. For some groups of people being a ‘victim’ is an objective 
phenomenon; when someone has been subject to harm, they are a victim, 
regardless of whether this is recognised by society or in law. While Henriques’ 
victim status is inextricably tied to legal recognition through judicial proceedings, 
and therefore to bestow victim status to someone who has not been through this 
process is incorrect.  
                                                     
1 An added complication here is that you may be able to prove you were subject to harm, but 
not be able to prove who the perpetrator of harm was.  
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It may be difficult to see how being a ‘victim’ can be an objective 
phenomenon, since what constitutes harm is not objective, but often changes 
over time, and is not always governed by or related to law. There are some 
arguably clear cases where victimhood seems like an objective phenomenon. 
Alan Turing was posthumously pardoned in 2013 after he was convicted in 1952 
for “gross indecency” for having a sexual relationship with another man (BBC, 
2013). At the time his pardon was granted, Justice Minister Chris Grayling 
described the original conviction as something we would now recognise as unjust 
and discriminatory (cited in BBC, 2013). One could argue that Turing was always 
a victim, objectively, but it has only been recognised more recently; the 
recognition of victim status is new, but the objective victimhood is not. This will 
depend upon whether the person considering this issue uses ‘victimhood’ to 
describe societal recognition of harm. One could argue that Turing was not a 
victim at the time, but now that societal and legal perceptions have changed, we 
consider Turing to be a victim of what is now considered an unjust law.  
The #MeToo movement, which will be discussed in more detail in later 
parts of this dissertation, also demonstrates the subjectivity of some harms. While 
some women would decry certain sexual comments as sexual harassment, 
others have argued that the freedom to decline a sexual proposition cannot exist 
without a man’s “freedom to bother”, and even that a woman could consider a 
man rubbing himself up against her on a subway as a “non-event” (Chiche et al., 
2018: Paragraph 11).  
In 2019, a UK tattoo-artist was jailed for 40 months after he removed one 
man’s ear, and split a woman’s tongue, at their request, and with their written 
consent (The Guardian, 2019). It was found that, despite the consent of his 
clients, the tattoo-artist was guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. 
What prosecutors and a jury saw as ‘harm’, the clients had requested and paid 
for.  
Not only is ‘harm’ emerging as subjective, at least in some cases, it has 
become clear that being subject to harm is not sufficient criteria for victim status. 
As earlier discussed, many of us have experienced harm and yet do not consider 
ourselves ‘victims’, and furthermore, some levels of harm are considered 
acceptable as punishment. For example, imprisonment, and separation from 
family and friends, can certainly be considered harmful to prisoners. However, as 
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a society we do not often recognise prisoners as victims of the judicial process 
simply because they have experienced harm.  
Christie (1986: 18) argues that being a victim is not an “objective 
phenomenon”, and there will be cases of disagreement about who is a victim, 
because much of what makes a person a victim depends not only on wider 
societal views, but also on the views of the person themselves, and their definition 
of the situation. Christie refers to his own experience of victimhood, in which he 
felt he was conned into agreeing to a race with a colleague, who turned out to be 
a champion runner. Although Christie has experienced theft and burglary, he did 
not recognise those situations as ones of which he had been a ‘victim’, but felt 
more strongly about the dishonesty he had experienced with regard to the race 
(Ibid.). Christie would perhaps then agree with Kim Phuc and Eger, whose 
comments suggest that victim status depends upon the subject’s perception of 
the situation.  
Again, we can see that the word ‘victim’ has been used to describe many 
different phenomenon; ‘victim’ according to law, ‘victim’ according to society, 
‘victim’ according to personal view, and ‘a person who has been harmed’, are all 
referred to with no clear distinction. With the word being used to cover so many 
different concepts, without the exact use of the word being defined, it is inevitable 
that confusion and miscommunication will arise.  
In direct contrast to Henriques, Bailey (2015; cited in Henriques, 2016: 9) 
opposes the use of the word ‘complainant’, arguing that refusal to acknowledge 
someone as a victim during the investigative process “will have a significant 
detrimental effect on the trust victims now have on the authorities and 
fundamentally damage the efforts of many organisations re-built over the years.” 
For Bailey, referring to these individuals simply as a “complainant” is problematic 
and “reinforces a system based on distrust and disbelief” (Ibid.).  
This view is supported by others who have argued that if a victim feels that 
they have not been believed, not only do they potentially not achieve the 
recognition they deserve, or justice, but this experience of not being believed can 
make them feel re-victimised (Hayes et al., 2013).  
Bailey argues that refusal to use the word ‘victim’ is not a sign of 
impartiality, agnosticism, or suspended belief, but of active disbelief or doubt. In 
a letter to Police and Crime Commissioners, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, 
of which Bailey is a member, stated: “to start an investigation from a position of 
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doubt is unlikely to encourage victims to come forward” (cited in Henriques, 2016: 
14). Conversely, Henriques (2016: 20) describes doubt as “the hallmark of 
impartiality.” 
This coincidentally serves as another example of that subtle but potentially 
hazardous issue that arises from a broad agreement about the primary meaning 
of a word, and a hidden discrepancy about the secondary meaning of a word. It 
is apparent that Henriques and Bailey do not have an entirely shared 
understanding of the concept of ‘doubt’. While the Oxford English Dictionary 
(2020b) records the definition of doubt as “a feeling of uncertainty or lack of 
conviction”, in general use, (and therefore in general meaning) to doubt 
something usually indicates that you believe something to be unlikely. To utter 
the phrase “I doubt it” would not be understood as “I am impartial”. Therefore, 
while Henriques sees ‘doubt’ as akin to indecision and impartiality, Bailey sees 
‘doubt’ as distrust and disbelief. Both Henriques and Bailey agree that to avoid 
using the word ‘victim’ demonstrates doubt. Henriques may say “to demonstrate 
doubt is good”, and Bailey may say “to demonstrate doubt is bad”, but without 
sharing the same understanding of what it means to doubt, they are talking past 
one another.  
Interestingly, Henriques (2016) believes that when someone simply 
applies the word ‘victim’ when referring to the individual making a complaint, they 
perform several actions at once. For example, they label the individual, they 
demonstrate a level of belief with regard to the allegation made, they imply to the 
accused that at this present snapshot in time they are considered to have 
committed the offence they are accused of, they attempt to reverse the burden of 
proof. Bailey also believes that when someone applies the word ‘victim’ with 
reference to the individual making an accusation they perform several actions at 
once. For example, they label the individual, they demonstrate a level of trust and 
belief in the credibility of the reporter, they reassure the reporter that they will be 
taken seriously. The multiple things we can do with words will be revisited shortly.  
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1.iv. Is the concept of ‘victim’ essentially contested? 
 
As I hope to have demonstrated, despite the word ‘victim’ being used regularly, 
those who employ the term do not always do so with the same concept in mind. 
 I have demonstrated that the meaning of a word is found in the use of the 
word, and therefore, a person’s understanding of the meaning of a word, and the 
connotations they attach to the word, will relate to the way they have experienced 
it being used. A person’s exact interpretation of a concept will be “inextricably 
tied” to their experience of the use of that concept, and other background 
assumptions (Lukes, 2005: 30). 
This may prompt us to ask if victimhood is an “essentially contested 
concept’’; a phrase coined by Gallie to describe terms which, when the different 
uses are examined, are found not to have “one clearly definable general use” to 
set as the “correct” or “standard” use (Gallie, 1955: 168). Gallie gave the 
examples of art, democracy and Christian doctrine to demonstrate concepts 
which inevitably result in “endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of 
their users” (Ibid.: 169). 
 At first glance, this seems true of victimhood. However, an essentially 
contested concept is not simply a concept which is hotly contested, with no 
resolution reached. It is a concept for which resolution cannot be reached, a 
concept which has “contestation at the core” (Waldron, 2002: 149), the very 
essence of the concept is contested, and the dispute cannot be resolved by any 
argument at all (Gallie, 1955). Can this be said of the concept of ‘victimhood’?  
Waldron points out that the location of the dispute is key to establishing if 
something is essentially contested, or just highly contested. It is key to identify if 
the location of the dispute is at the core of the concept; do people disagree about 
what it is to be a victim? For some contested concepts (note, not essentially 
contested concepts), the dispute is not about the essence of a concept, rather it 
is about whether or not something meets the threshold to be counted as falling 
within the remit of that concept. Waldron (2002) gives the example of the colours 
blue and green. Two people can agree on what the colour blue is, but they may 
argue about whether a coat is blue, if the colour of the coat is on the outskirts of 
the blue spectrum. If one person says, “The coat is blue” and another says “I think 
it’s more green”, this does not mean they do not agree about what blue is, but in 
this case they dispute whether the coat colour has met the criteria to be counted 
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as blue. This is what Waldron (2002: 149) would describe as a “marginal case”. 
However, if the coat was clearly blue, a “paradigm” case of blueness, and one 
person said “The coat is blue” and the other replied “The coat is clearly red”, they 
would have a dispute about the concept of blue. When they said the word “blue” 
they would have had different concepts in mind.  
So, in order to establish if the concept of victimhood is essentially 
contested, we must first identify where the dispute about the concept is located. 
In the case of a person shunning the victim label because they see victims as 
weak and powerless, I have argued that this is conflation of definition with 
connotation, which is often how the meanings of words change over time, but in 
this case, there are so many versions and different connotations associated with 
victimhood, one definitive change of meaning has not occurred. In this case, the 
associations with weakness and powerlessness, it appears to be a contestation 
not of what it is to be a victim, the concept of victimhood itself, but more accurately 
a dispute over what sort of person is most likely to become a victim. This does 
not demonstrate that victimhood is an essentially contested concept, but merely 
that assumptions are often made about the characteristics and behaviours a 
person who has been recognised as a victim may exhibit. These assumptions 
differ depending on the experiences each person has had both of victims first-
hand, of hearing victims discussed, and of seeing them in the media, and 
represent connotations they will then associate with victimhood.  
In the case of the dispute between Henriques and Bailey, prima facie the 
debate seems to be not what it is to be a victim, but rather when someone 
becomes a victim; at what stage someone meets the threshold to be considered 
a victim. This dispute sits on the margins of the concept, like the marginal 
applications of the concept of blue, but we assume paradigm cases of victimhood, 
very clear cases of victimhood, will be agreed.  
However, it could be considered that the “when?” should be part of the 
definition of victimhood, and if Henriques believes that a person can only be 
recognised as a victim when they have been recognised as such in law, and 
Bailey believes they should be considered a victim as soon as they alert the 
appropriate authorities, perhaps the location of the dispute is at the core of the 
dispute rather than on the periphery. So rather than a victim being someone who 
has been harmed, a ‘victim’, for Henriques, is someone who has been harmed 
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and has had this proven in a court of law, and for Bailey a ‘victim’ is someone 
who has come forward and reported having been harmed.   
If we were to accept that there is no objective state of being a victim 
(Christie, 1986), although there are widely accepted instances which are guided 
by our socially governed laws, there is no reason to suggest that either Henriques’ 
or Bailey’s definition would be closer to the truth than the other. This seems to fit 
with the definition of an essentially contested concept. We could say that there 
are at least two co-existing understandings of the concept of victimhood, which 
are “perfectly genuine”, “not resolvable”, and sustained by “perfectly respectable 
arguments” (Gallie, 1955: 169). 
However, I do not think the above is an accurate outline of the dispute 
which remains between the views of Henriques and Bailey. In fact, I propose that 
Henriques and Bailey do not have any dispute over the concept of victimhood at 
all. Given all the relevant facts about a situation, I believe it very likely that 
Henriques and Bailey would agree over which individuals fall within the 
categorisation of ‘victim’, and which do not. Furthermore, I do not believe the 
dispute is about when someone becomes a victim, as I suspect that both would 
say that the true point of becoming a victim is neither at the point when a person 
approaches the authorities, nor when the perpetrator has been proven guilty in a 
court of law, but that the state of victimhood arises at the very point that harm 
takes place. Social acknowledgement at the time of harm is not necessary, as 
we can look back now at people who were not recognised as victims at the time 
of harm, and recognise that they were victims, despite not being recognised as 
such at the time.  
The dispute between Henriques and Bailey is about the point in time at 
which it is appropriate to use the word ‘victim’, more specifically, how certain we 
need to be about a person’s claim to the ‘victim’ label before we employ the word, 
and the consequences of our use of words. 
 
1.v. What do we do with words? 
 
Both Henriques and Bailey believe the use of the word ‘victim’ as a label is highly 
significant, and propose that improper use, or improper timing of the word does 
something; i.e. it tells the reporter that you believe them (Bailey), or it tells the 
accused that they have been assumed guilty (Henriques). These claims suggest 
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a strange phenomenon, our ability to do something with our use of words beyond 
the simple act of speech.  
Austin (1962: 12) recognised this phenomenon when he said “to say 
something is to do something”, some types of utterance are performative, “the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action”. 
In fact, for Austin, when we commit the “act” of speaking a word or phrase, 
we can do several things at once. The first of these is the “locutionary act” which 
is the basic act of uttering a word or sentence. Further to this there is the 
simultaneous “illocutionary act”, which is what we are doing with our utterance, 
e.g. answering a question, giving an order, announcing our arrival. So, our 
locutionary act is our use of speech, and our illocutionary act is what we do with 
that speech. Austin explains, “in general the locutionary act as much as the 
illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both” (Ibid.: 146). 
Additionally, there is a third “act” we can perform when we speak, the 
“perlocutionary act”, which Austin defines as the “consequential effects upon the 
feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other 
persons” (Ibid.: 101). A locutionary act would be “he said that…”, the illocutionary 
act would be “he argued that…” and the perlocutionary act would be “he 
convinced me that…” (Ibid.: 102). 
During a wedding ceremony, to say “I do” is an act of speech, an utterance 
of words, a locutionary act. In this special circumstance however, in this particular 
context, in saying “I do”, you marry; “Saying "I do" in the right context counts as 
– constitutes – marrying: that is the illocutionary act performed.” (Langton, 1993: 
300). If in the same context you were to shout “Foghorn!”, you would commit a 
locutionary act, however, in saying this word you would not leave the church 
having entered into marriage. The act of saying “I do” is entering into marriage.  
The matter of which illocutionary act is performed often depends upon the 
circumstances in which the speech act is performed, and who is performing the 
act; “it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered 
should be in some way, or ways, appropriate… Thus, for naming the ship, it is 
essential that I should be the person appointed to name her” (Austin, 1962: 8).  
 This echoes the earlier discussion between meaning and use, and 
Conant’s proposal, “there isn’t anything which can properly count as asking the 
question ‘What do the words [that have been spoken] mean?’ apart from a 
simultaneous consideration of questions such as, ‘When was it said?’, ‘Where?’, 
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‘By whom?’, ‘To whom?’, etc.” (1998: 239). Here, we see that Austin is making a 
comparable point, the kind of illocutionary act which is performed when using a 
certain word or phrase is clearly linked to the context; who said it, when, where 
etc. If any other person than that person appointed to name a ship were to leap 
in and proclaim “I name this ship the Mr Stalin”, the ship will not have been named 
(Austin, 1962: 23). This is because there are certain conditions which speech 
must meet in order to determine which illocutionary act will be performed, the 
“felicity conditions” (Langton, 1993: 301).  
Langton (1993: 302) demonstrates how powerful an illocutionary act can 
be when she gives the case of a legislator in apartheid-era Pretoria announcing 
“Blacks are not permitted to vote”.  When the legislator says this, they do not just 
state a fact, but the utterance itself makes the fact so. The act of uttering those 
words, when the felicity conditions are met (uttered by someone with the political 
power to set out legislation), is what prevents black people from being permitted 
to vote. Uttered by someone else, this would not have the same illocution, 
because the ability to have this illocutionary force is linked to whether the speaker 
has authority in the relevant field.  
Langton (1993: 297) applied Austin’s speech acts theory to pornography 
(which she argues is speech, since it is protected by the First Amendment) to 
demonstrate how pornography “silences” women. Following on from the work of 
MacKinnon, Langton’s aim was to show not only that pornography depicts 
subordination (locution), and not only that pornography causes subordination 
(perlocution), but that pornography itself is an act of subordination (illocution). 
Langton (1993: 307) suggests that pornography seems to have the appropriate 
“authority” in the domain of “speech about sex” to tell those who listen what is 
appropriate and permissible in this realm. Therefore, by depicting subordination 
of women, it tells its hearers that this is part of the sexual game.  
In depicting women as saying “no”, when they mean “yes”, within the 
sexual domain, pornography prevents women from having the ability to refuse in 
this domain. This is the “silencing” Langton refers to. It is not that women have 
their ability to speak, their locution, silenced, for they can still utter the word “no”, 
but it is a different sort of silencing that Langton wants to demonstrate. Aside from 
this most obvious example of silencing, there are two further types that Langton 
presents. “Perlocutionary frustration” is when the intended effect of speech is not 
successful, e.g. one invites, but nobody attends the party (Ibid.: 315). But the type 
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of silencing referred to by Langton with regard to pornography is “illocutionary 
disablement” (Ibid.).  
 With regard to Langton’s argument around pornography, a woman may 
encounter perlocutionary frustration if she utters the word “no” to a man to refuse 
his sexual advances, and he hears the word, he understands her intention to 
refuse (her illocution), but it does not have the effect she desires, as he does not 
stop. This is, of course, rape. Illocutionary disablement, however, is where a 
woman says “no” to a sexual advance, but it is not acknowledged as a refusal, 
as the hearer does not recognise the word “no” coming from a woman in the 
sexual realm as constituting refusal. In pornography, there is no term represented 
which would be acknowledged as a woman refusing sexual advances. As a 
woman, in the sexual realm, refusal is not available, “Refusal-in that context-has 
become unspeakable for her” (Ibid.: 321). 
Langton’s three types of silence are tied to the three types of speech acts 
Austin describes. Certainly, it is true that silencing of the traditional “locutionary” 
sort, preventing one from uttering the words at all, is not the only time we might 
feel silenced. However, it is not, I suggest, immediately clear that perlocutionary 
frustration, as described by Langton, truly represents a form of silencing. Langton 
gives the following examples of perlocutionary frustration; inviting people to a 
party, but they do not attend, voting to oust the government, but being 
outnumbered by other people’s votes, arguing a point, but failing to persuade 
others of your point of view (Ibid.). Initially, it seems dangerous to suggest that 
every person who does not get their own way can say that they have been 
‘silenced’. 
To get to the centre of the issue here, let us start by exploring the 
perlocutionary act, according to Austin. Austin (1962) says that to perform a 
locutionary act, we will normally produce certain consequential effects upon the 
feelings, thoughts or actions of those who hear us, which he labels the 
perlocutionary act. To some this may at first seem an odd claim; surely, the 
consequent feeling of someone who has heard me speak cannot be part of my 
action in speaking. However, if I say “Hi” to a friend, the illocutionary act is to 
greet my friend, but suppose they did not realise I was there, and by saying “Hi” 
I surprised them. It would make perfect sense for my friend to say “you surprised 
me!” suggesting that my act of saying “Hi” resulted in a further, perhaps 
unintentional, act which I have performed.  
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 In some cases, the perlocutionary act will not be unintentional, it may in 
fact form a large part of the motivation for the utterance. Suppose you want to 
impress someone: you inform them that you have recently won an award (the 
illocutionary act here is to inform), but you hope that the consequence of your 
informing them of this will be that they are impressed. Unfortunately, they seem 
quite indifferent, and the perlocutionary effect you intended is unsuccessful, or in 
Langton’s words, “frustrated”. If the perlocutionary effect is part of a speech act, 
and maybe even the aim of the speech, it follows that something preventing the 
success of this speech act is considered “silencing”, “If speech is action, then 
silence is failure to act” (Langton, 1993: 314). Ordinarily, we might think of 
silencing as preventing someone from speaking at all, e.g. gagging them, or, 
perhaps letting them speak, but discrediting them by pointing to some previous 
act of theirs which could demonstrate that they are not worthy of trust, so that 
when they speak they are less likely to be taken seriously by hearers, and less 
likely therefore to achieve the intended consequences of their speech. However, 
the type of silencing Langton describes here does not need to be implemented 
by someone else, silence simply means failure to perform the speech act 
intended, whether locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary.  
 Therefore, while at first it seems too strong a claim to say that someone 
who votes but does not get the outcome they intended when they submitted their 
vote has been silenced, it is important not to think of this as illocutionary or 
locutionary silence. 
There are two particularly relevant features from Langton’s paper that will 
be taken forward into this discussion of victimhood, and power. Firstly, that certain 
people have the power to do things with their words that others do not, because 
of the circumstances, and sometimes because of who they are, “To utter the 
words "mutallaqa, mutallaqa, mutallaqa" (literally "divorced, divorced, divorced") 
is to perform the illocutionary act of divorce in a country where Islamic law is in 
force, provided certain felicity conditions are met. Pronounced by a husband to 
his wife, it is an act of divorce. Not so if it is pronounced by the wife to her 
husband. No matter how hard she tries, a woman cannot succeed in divorcing 
her spouse by making that or any relevantly similar utterance. Divorce of that kind 
is an act that is unspeakable for women” (Ibid.: 317). It is not that the wife has 
made the illocutionary act of divorce but does not achieve her intended effect, it 
is that the illocutionary act of divorce is not available to her in the same way that 
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it is for her husband. Secondly, what Langton has shown is that the speech of 
one person or group of people, who have authority within that domain, can impact 
the ability of others to have successful speech within that domain. We can do 
things with our words, and one of those things is prevent other people from doing 
the things they intend to do with their words.  
 
1.vi. What do we do when we use the word ‘victim’? 
 
I believe it follows that, in addition to having the ability to prevent others doing 
what they intend to do with their speech, if the appropriate authority is present, 
there are alternative ways one person’s speech can affect another person’s 
speech; for instance, one speech act can result in another speech act being more 
successful. A Company Director has authority within his business to make 
decisions. During a meeting, the Director makes the following statement: “Going 
forward, Stephen will be making decisions about where we should invest our 
money”. Prior to this announcement, Stephen could make recommendations 
about where he felt the business should invest their money, but the speech act 
conducted by the Company Director, who has the authority to delegate power to 
his employees, has given Stephen the power to decide where the company 
money is invested. Now when Stephen says “I think we should invest our money 
in X”, with the perlocutionary intention of causing the investment of money in X, 
there is a much higher probability that Stephen will achieve his intended 
perlocutionary act, as a direct result of the Director’s speech act.  
Now returning to the dispute represented between Henriques and Bailey, 
with some basic understanding of speech acts in mind, we may ask what we are 
doing with the word ‘victim’, when we use this as a label, particularly with regard 
to who uses the word, and at what stage in time. 
Those sympathetic to Henriques’ view may argue that, for a person with 
some involvement in the investigative or judicial process (someone who therefore 
has authority in this domain), to use the word ‘victim’ to refer to an individual 
making an accusation, from the outset of the investigation, would be to commit 
the illocutionary act of acknowledging them as a genuine victim, and concurrently 
this demonstrates that you consider their account truthful, or at the very least, 
likely to be true. In calling them a ‘victim’, you make a judgement about the validity 
of their allegation. A possible consequence, or perlocutionary effect, is to make 
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the accused party feel that you believe the accuser, and to prematurely convey a 
guilty judgement onto them. 
For those sympathetic to Bailey, to use the word ‘complainant’ when 
referring to the same individual is to commit the illocutionary act of actively 
doubting the accuser. In referring to them as ‘complainant’, you withhold trust and 
belief in their testimony. By calling them merely a ‘complainant’, the 
perlocutionary effect might be to damage the relationship between the authorities 
and that particular individual, and to reverse the improved relationship achieved 
in recent years between victims and the authorities, which has removed some 
barriers to crime reporting; “Evidence shows that a fear of disbelief or being 
blamed for what has happened is a barrier to people coming forward and 
reporting their crimes, especially for sexual offences or more personal crime” 
(Beckley, 2018: Paragraph 7.3.1).  
Those who propose that victimhood is a social construct (Christie, 1986), 
may further argue that in using the word victim, you recognise this person as a 
victim, and that recognition itself is what makes them a victim (at least 
temporarily, as this recognition can be rescinded if evidence to the contrary 
comes to light). Wijk (2013: 160) claims that for a person wishing to claim victim 
status, “it is crucial that (s)he can frame him- or herself as a victim and 
consequently manages to convince ‘us’, the ones who legitimize his/her status, 
of being a victim.” Just as when the legislator in Pretoria said “Blacks are not 
permitted to vote”, they both described a state of affairs and made this the state 
of affairs, so too does a person recognising someone as a victim make it so.  
If it is the case that the use of the word ‘victim’, employed by those with 
relevant authority, can have the effect of commenting upon the legitimacy of the 
accuser’s account, and furthermore, can suggest disbelief of the accused party, 
and particularly if using the word ‘victim’ as a label for someone constitutes part 
of a formal recognition or bestowal of victim status, then we can see that it is a 
label that should be used only with careful consideration. Of course, not all 
discussions about ‘victims’ take place in these settings. While Henriques, Bailey, 
and their colleagues continue to debate at which point in the investigative and 
judicial process it is appropriate to introduce the word ‘victim’, it is important to 
recognise that this discussion has a wider application. Not all cases will be given 
a day in court. For example, if an individual reports being burgled, but no suspect 
is identified, there will be no opportunity for conviction. We would not want to 
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refrain from referring to the individual impacted by this event as a victim and 
refuse to offer him victim support because, as Henriques (2016: 8) might argue, 
it has not been determined “whether or not a “complainant” is indeed a “victim””.  
So there are practical issues to the avoidance of assigning ‘victim’ status. 
In his review, Beckley (2018: Paragraph 3.4) revealed that in focus groups held 
with “police investigators”, it was acknowledged that “putting a person in the 
victim ‘box’” entitled them to support services and processes. With some trials 
taking place over a number of years, and some cases never reaching court at all, 
it seems appropriate that victims should not have to wait until there has been a 
conviction in order to receive victim support.  
Henriques’ proposal that an individual be labelled a victim only once the 
court has convicted a suspect is also problematic, as it is based upon the 
assumption that the court will make the correct decision in every instance in which 
there is a genuine victim. Of course, this is simply not the case. For there to be a 
conviction in the British Legal System there is a high standard of proof, namely, 
that offence must be proven ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Judges are advised to 
direct the jury that “before they can return a verdict of guilty, they must be sure 
that the defendant is guilty” (BAILII, 2009). It is inescapable that there will be 
cases in which there is insufficient evidence to reach this standard of proof, but 
where the defendant did commit the crime nonetheless: “a not guilty verdict does 
not necessarily signal actual innocence. One can be acquitted for reasons 
unrelated to actual innocence (e.g. because the state’s evidence is shaky or a 
jury’s sentiment overwhelms its commitment to accuracy or the defendant is an 
accomplished liar)” (Givelber and Farrel, 2012: 2). But, according to Henriques, 
the individual who has made the accusation cannot be referred to as a ‘victim’ if 
the court does not find the defendant guilty, although this does not mean the 
person who reported the offence is not a victim.  
Prior to the publication of Henriques’ report, the Metropolitan Police had 
been working in line with a policy of automatically believing people who come 
forward to report a crime; a policy which is set out by the College of Policing, “At 
the point when someone makes an allegation of crime, the police should believe 
the account given and a crime report should be completed” (Henriques, 2016: 
14). As a result of the recommendations made in Henriques’ report, Cressida 
Dick, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, announced in April 2018 that as 
a Police force they would end their application of this policy (Hamilton and 
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Sylvester, 2018). The policy was originally adopted following the investigation into 
crimes committed by former BBC presenter Jimmy Savile (Operation Yewtree) 
and was intended to encourage victims of similar abuse to feel empowered to 
come forward and report.  
In light of Henriques’ report, in July 2019, the College of Policing in the UK 
wrote to the Home Office requesting clarity on these policies. In a statement 
published at that time, the College of Policing (2019: Paragraph 4) wrote that 
Henriques had recommended “ceasing the instruction to believe a victim’s 
account.” This is again inaccurate, because Henriques actually recommends that 
there is not automatic belief of the ‘complainant’s’ account, not the ‘victim’s’ 
account. For Henriques, the issue of whether they are actually a ‘victim’ is the 
very reason why their account should not be automatically believed. I will propose 
a more neutral solution to the victim/complainant terminology disagreement in the 
conclusion of the dissertation.  
 Here we have seen that questions of, ‘When was it said?’, ‘Where?’, ‘By 
whom?’ and ‘To whom?’, are important not only in establishing what a word 
means, but these contextual considerations are also relevant to what a word can 
do, what illocutionary force it can have, or what perlocutionary effect it may have.  
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Section 2: The Powerful Victim 
 
2.i. The three roles in victimhood 
 
Now, applying the theory of speech acts, and the idea that one person’s speech 
can affect another person’s speech (e.g. silence them, or make their speech more 
credible), we can begin to examine the effects of labelling someone a ‘victim’. 
Before continuing, I will introduce a device I have formulated which I will call the 
‘Victim-Power Triangle’. This will assist in clearly demonstrating at each stage 
how the power dynamic can change when a person is recognised as a ‘victim’, 
depending on a number of conditions.  
 Triangles have been used extensively to demonstrate dynamics in 
relationships within psychology and sociology, and particularly within 
transactional analysis. Eric Berne, the father of transactional analysis, is reported 
to have advised his students, “Don’t say anything that you cannot diagram” (cited 
in Karpman, 2019: 7). For example, in 1968, Karpman, a student of Berne, 
devised the ‘Drama Triangle’, which he used to illustrate the ways in which 
individuals interact with one another, particularly during conflict. This triangle has 
been widely adopted by therapists around the world, and many academics have 
proposed methods that can be used within psychotherapy to avoid or step out 
from within the triangle (Choy, 1990; Gunther, 1993). 
 The three positions of Karpman’s Drama Triangle are Victim, Persecutor 
and Rescuer. During any form of drama or conflict, the disputants draw one 
another into the roles of the triangle, and throughout the conflict they will switch 
between at least two of the roles. The individual who takes up the Victim role 
need only self-identify as such, and will then draw in an individual who they 
identify as their Persecutor. The Rescuer role is a person drawn into the conflict 
 41 
to defend or support the Victim in some way. In Karpman’s triangle, the Rescuer 
can be a third party, but in some variations, the Rescuer role can be adopted by 
one of the two original parties in conflict, as they move around the triangle. 
My own proposed ‘Victim-Power Triangle’ applies similar labels to 
Karpman’s Drama Triangle, but looks at the three roles on a wider conceptual 
scale. It moves from the micro-level of focussing in on individuals engaged in 
conflict, to the conceptual macro-level, looking at groups of people, for example, 
how the power balance shifts when alleged victims approach the relevant 
authorities, drawing in investigators, prosecutors and, to some extent the 
members of wider society to recognise their victimhood, in relation to named 
Persecutor(s).  
Those outside of the conflict, with the ability to recognise and assign victim 
status, will be referred to as ‘Rescuer/Recogniser’. I propose that it is 
predominantly the views and reactions of the persons in the Rescuer/Recogniser 
role, those people who make up the wider members of society, juries, and those 
who represent public bodies like the police, that have the greatest bearing upon 
the power dynamic between the three positions, and the power of the Potential 
Victim’s speech.  
Those who are either recognised as ‘victims’, or attempt to be recognised 
as such, will be referred to as ‘Potential Victim’. I have chosen to use this 
terminology, which is used in the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015), because within 
that act the term represents a person who is suspected to be a victim, but where 
a final decision on this status has not been made. Throughout the examples 
examined, there will be times where ‘victim’ or perhaps ‘putative victim’ might be 
a closer description of the position, but for consistency, I will use “Potential Victim” 
throughout. Those who are accused of being, or considered to be, the 




In order to identify the power balance within a given scenario, it is necessary to 
address how ‘power’ is to be defined, and what features of power, thus defined, 
have measurable qualities.  
Power is a concept that has been postulated at length by scholars across 
the disciplines, and which has been defined in many different ways. Voltaire 
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described power as “making others act as I choose” (cited in Arendt, 1970: 36).  
For Russell, power consists in achieving your intended effects, “It is easy to say, 
roughly, that A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and 
B only a few” (cited in Lukes, 1986: 19). Power has been described as 
participation in decision-making (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950), while Weber (1965: 
152) defined power as “The probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance.” 
 If we consider these definitions with regard to powerful figures throughout 
history, we would most likely agree that a powerful leader, such as Adolf Hitler, 
certainly had the ability to make others act as he chose, and deciding who had 
more power between two politicians, we might well try to evaluate how many of 
their own intended effects they had each achieved.  
 Equally, outside of the political realm, when applied to powerful figures in 
literature, such as William Shakespeare and Jane Austen, we can imagine that 
each had the intention of creating multiple pieces of great literature, and they 
achieved these desired outcomes. However, we need look no further than 
Vincent Van Gough to realise that while his intention to create great art was 
achieved, in his lifetime he lacked the power that we might expect to coincide 
with his achievements, because his brilliance was only recognised posthumously. 
Had he received this recognition in life, it is likely that he would have had more 
opportunity to achieve his desired effects. Therefore, it would appear that the 
ability to achieve power does not merely reside with the bearer of power, but there 
is often some relation to recognition by another individual or group. This is evident 
if we consider the authority of the Law. The Law is only powerful while the people 
who are governed by it acknowledge it as authoritative. As Russell (2004: 25) 
said, “the Law is almost powerless when it is not supported by public sentiment”. 
The Law, and those who impose it, have authority over the people who are 
governed by it, but the people who are governed by it also have enormous 
collective power in this relationship, because without their recognition of the 
authority of the Law, it would not have the same power over them. It is a fragile 
and co-dependent relationship. This group power is also demonstrated by 
Tarnow (2002), who gives the example of the power a drill sergeant has over 
each individual recruit when the group are not lined up, compared with the power 
she then has when the recruits are all lined up, Tarnow (2002: 3) explains, “Each 
recruit knows that if he gets out of line, as long as he is the only one doing it, he 
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has to face a P [power] confrontation with the sergeant.” The recognition of the 
drill sergeant’s power by the other recruits means that each individual recruit is 
less likely to question it.  
Recognition from others, then, is often a prerequisite for power, and group 
or societal recognition can increase power. Indeed, it is the fact that power 
depends so heavily upon recognition and acknowledgement from other members 
of society that means power is not static nor permanent, but can grow, and 
equally can be lost entirely in an instant.  
Talcott Parsons (1963: 77) describes power as “a circulating medium, 
analogous to money” which has value only in exchange. Of course, interpersonal 
power can only exist between people, it cannot stand alone. Many of the 
interpersonal power dynamics we experience are based upon socially 
acknowledged roles and relationships; presidents with the power to make 
decisions, teachers with authority to control the class. Outside of our social reality, 
if these roles were no longer acknowledged, these power dynamics would no 
longer exist.  
This idea that certain things only have a ‘social reality’ is one that has been 
written about at length by John Searle (1999: §16), who also uses the example 
of money, which has “rather uninteresting” properties, but takes on certain 
importance within society because we agree that it is important. Money only 
performs the functions it does because people agree that it has those functions. 
Searle explains that this applies to all manner of things within our social universe, 
from language to marriage, cocktail parties to Presidents (Ibid.). Each of these 
things only exist insofar as we mutually recognise their reality.   
In the same way, some types of power also only exist within our social 
universe, and the powerful individual has power within society only while there is 
recognition of that power from the members of the society. As with the Law, the 
relationship between a person who is powerful within society and the people they 
have power over within society is a co-dependant relationship.  
Attempts to more precisely define what social power is, or how it manifests, 
are likely to prove difficult. In fact, Lukes (1979: §15)  has described the concept 
of power as being ‘essentially contested’, and argues that there will always be 
endless yet “perfectly genuine” disputes about the correct use or interpretation of 
the concept because all attempts to define it are “inextricably tied to further 
background assumptions”, and therefore the use will be different for different 
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groups of people within society. However, among this cafeteria of definitions or 
uses of the concept, there will be some over-arching themes which will be more 
widely accepted, and Lukes acknowledges that the different uses will serve “not-
unrelated functions” (Ibid.). Therefore, I will endeavour to keep my measures 
quite broad.  
 
2.iii. Measuring power dynamics 
 
While it is common for individual people, or groups of people, to be described as 
powerful, in reality people do not possess power in a social vacuum, rather they 
may have power over someone, in a certain situation. This type of power exists 
within the relationships between people, not as an attribute of a person 
themselves, “to say that “X has power” is vacant, unless we specify “over whom”” 
(Emerson, 1962: 32). Since this is the case, a person can both appear to be very 
powerful in relation to one person, while being subservient to another (Ibid.).  
 When someone has power within a social situation, or perhaps over the 
other people within the situation, what does this look like? What is required for a 
person to achieve their intended effects or desired outcomes within that situation, 
or to have influence upon the decisions being made?  
Those who have postulated the concept of power at length often fall into 
different camps. Some thinkers such as Mills (1956: 3) argue that people and 
groups can possess a general power over a wide range of situations and areas 
because of certain characteristics they possess, and pointed to the “power elite” 
who influence decisions which “mightily affect the everyday worlds of ordinary 
men and women”. Conversely, I believe, along with writers, such as Dahl, that 
power exists on more of a case-by-case basis, and that context needs to be 
specified. For Dahl (1958), we can only ascertain which person or group of people 
has the power within a situation when the given situation and context is specified, 
and the preferences of that person or group regularly prevails over the 
preferences of others.  
 In trying to identify what measurable attributes a person who holds power 
within a given situation may have, it is useful to think conversely about what lack 
of power may look like. A person may feel they lack power within a particular 
situation if their opinion does not seem to influence decision-making, or if they 
cannot seem to make their opinion heard at all. In contrast, a person with power 
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within a given situation may find that their voice is more significant than others in 
the room. Their opinion is sought out, and then considered as part of a decision-
making process, or perhaps even supersedes other opinions. As Langton has 
explored within her work, there is a strong relationship between speech and 
power. She summarises (1993: 299), “To put the point crudely: powerful people 
can generally do more, say more, and have their speech count for more than can 
the powerless. If you are powerful, there are more things you can do with your 
words.” Strength of voice will be the first measure I will consider when assessing 
a person’s power within a situation. Strength of voice will be measured on a scale 
from 1-3: 
 
Ability to make voice heard = 1 
Voice considered as part of decision-making process = 2 
Voice significant in decision-making process = 3 
 
The second measure I will use in calculating power will be credibility. Credibility 
is often likened to trustworthiness and ‘expertness’ (Hovland et al., 1953), and 
being truthful, believable, reasonable and competent (Schafran, 1995). Often, 
victims cite fear of not being believable, or not being credible, as a barrier to 
coming forward to report harm they have experienced. There appears to be a 
strong correlation between power within interpersonal relationships, and 
perceived levels of credibility, with women often being seen as generally less 
credible than men. Gilmore believes that the idea that women are not as reliable 
as men when it comes to truth telling is a cultural bias which is “woven into the 
application of justice” (Gilmore, 2017: 2), and Schafran (1995) concludes that 
women lack the credibility enjoyed by men because they are considered less 
competent, their harms and injuries are considered less serious, and because 
the context of claims is usually considered from a male perspective, because the 
world is “unused” to considering female points of view. 
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 Since social and interpersonal power relies so heavily upon the uptake of 
other members of society, levels of credibility among peers is of great import in 
assessing the level of power a person has within a situation. I will suggest that 
credibility be measured on a scale of 1-3: 
 
Low credibility = 1 
Medium credibility = 2 
High credibility = 3 
 
Although I will compare the voice and credibility of the three roles of the Victim-
Power Triangle, the power dynamic I am most interested in evaluating is the one 
which exists between the Potential Victim, and the Rescuer/Recogniser, as this 
will demonstrate how the speech of the Rescuer/Recogniser directly impacts 
upon the increase or loss of power for the Potential Victim. 
 
Power could be evaluated as a function of Strength of voice and Credibility, 
such that: P = V x C 
 
Where: 
P = Power 
V = Strength of voice 
C = Credibility 
 
 
2.iv. The power in victimhood 
 
The first type of scenario I will evaluate will be that in which being recognised as 
a victim influences the power balance in favour of the victim.  
When Henriques, and those supportive of his views, debate the term 
‘victim’, it is discussed as if it were a title to be earned, and as if a person’s 
victimhood must be proven in a court of law. To simply assume an individual’s 
‘victim’ status from the outset is to risk bestowing upon this individual a title they 
do not deserve. There must therefore be benefits of the title. ‘Victim’ is a status 
recognised throughout society, and as we have seen, one which is often met with 
strong opinions and numerous preconceptions. Christie (1986: 18) described 
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victim status as a public status, and one which has a similar “type and level of 
abstraction as that of a “hero” or a “traitor””.  
Both Henriques and Bailey appear to agree that once an individual has 
been recognised as a ‘victim’, that they concomitantly become credible, their 
words are deemed believable. This is precisely why Henriques wants to withhold 
this title until it has been decided by a jury, and also precisely why Bailey wants 
to apply the ‘victim’ title more leniently. To both sides then, it appears that the 
bestowal of the ‘victim’ title brings with it an element of power. Both sides could 
agree that when Rescuer/Recogniser uses the word ‘victim’ to describe 
someone, they commit the illocutionary act of declaring the accuser credible.  
To depict Henriques’ and Bailey’s position in terms of the Victim-Power 
Triangle: recognising someone as having victim status represents significant 
power for that individual because their word is considered credible, and they 
themselves are worthy of sympathy, and are to be regarded with certain protected 
status. For Henriques (2016), this is appropriate once a guilty verdict for the 
accused has been reached in court, but inappropriate before this point.  
Considering the case at the centre of Operation Midland, where an 
individual making accusations is referred to as the ‘victim’ from the outset: The 
Rescuer/Recogniser has high credibility (C = 3), as their view is not being 
questioned. They also have a very powerful voice (V = 3), as their view is key to 
decision-making processes. The Potential Victim has full credibility having been 
immediately acknowledged as a victim. Their views will be considered as part of 
decision-making processes, but will not govern the investigative routes taken (V 
= 2). The Alleged Perpetrator has little credibility (C = 1), because their defensive 
account is in doubt, and their voice will be heard, but will not have much influence 
upon decisions made in these processes (V = 1). 
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Therefore, the power of each party could be evaluated as follows: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V2 x C3 = P6 




2.v. All-powerful victim and competitive victim claims 
 
It is not difficult to see why Henriques wants to avoid giving this level of power 
and credibility to any individual who comes forward to Police to report that they 
have been a victim of crime, or why the Metropolitan Police have overturned their 
policy of automatically believing all reports after the errors made in Operation 
Midland. If every person who reports crime is instantly given victim status, without 
any requirement to provide proof, anyone can come forward and be taken at their 
word, and would continue to be unless evidence is found during the investigation 
which contradicts their account. While Henriques and Bailey disagree about how 
many people make false reports, with Bailey claiming it is around 0.1% of cases, 
they can both agree that at least some of those people who come forward 
reporting a crime, claiming ‘victim’ status, will be making false accusations 
(Henriques, 2016: 9).  
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When the person recognised as a victim has this level of power, 
automatically believing any accuser becomes potentially problematic. Suppose 
we agree that an accuser is a ‘victim’ automatically, and should remain a ‘victim’ 
until proven otherwise by a not-guilty verdict in court. This would align with the 
guidance provided by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in their 2014 
report, ‘Crime-recording: making the victim count’, which recommends, “the 
presumption that the victim should always be believed is institutionalised.” We 
believe the ‘victim’s’ accusation against the accused, and the accused becomes 
guilty until proven innocent.  
However, this may not be the end of the matter, for a not-guilty verdict 
does not necessarily demonstrate genuine innocence (Givelber and Farrel, 
2012), in some circumstances it merely indicates that the evidence available is 
not sufficient to prove either innocence or guilt. Thus, in such cases, the ‘not-
guilty’ verdict is not sufficient to show that the accuser is not a ‘victim’, only that 
their victimhood cannot be proven by legal standards. Therefore, there is no 
reason to stop referring to the person who made the complaint as ‘victim’.  
Further, not all cases will be heard in court. Before charges are brought 
against the accused in the British legal system, the Crown Prosecution Service 
will decide whether or not the case passes the evidential test, and if it appears 
that there is not a realistic chance of conviction the case will not go before the 
court in the first place, no matter how serious the allegation may be (CPS, 2018). 
This is only a test of the evidence, however, so this does not prove that the 
accuser is not a victim. Since the accused has not been proven to be innocent of 
the crime, there is no reason to suppose that the accuser is not a ‘victim’; and so, 
it continues.  
If it is indeed the case that an individual need only make a report to Police 
in order to acquire ‘victim’ status, in the case of one individual reporting against 
another, the accused need only make a counter accusation to the Police about 
the accuser, and they too automatically become a ‘victim’. Arguably, this would 
be equally detrimental to the trust between the reporter and the Police as Bailey 
feared the term ‘complainant’ would be, as the accuser could quickly find that the 
person they have found the courage to report to the authorities is now also being 
referred to as a ‘victim’.  
This type of counter-claim attitude to victimhood has become evident in 
recent years. For someone accused of any form of misconduct, victimhood can 
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serve as the ultimate defence. If a person claiming to be a victim must be 
assumed credible, then there is no easier way to silence a critic than to claim 
‘victim’ status for yourself.  
In July 2018, Dr Christine Blasey Ford came forward to report that Brett 
Kavanagh, who was at that time a Supreme Court nominee, had sexually 
assaulted her in the early 1980s (Brown, 2018). In September 2018, Ford 
appeared in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee to share her statement about 
the incident. Kavanaugh was then given the opportunity to share his own 
testimony in response to the allegations, and used the opportunity to highlight his 
own claim to victimhood. “Since my nomination in July, there’s been a frenzy on 
the left to come up with something, anything to block my confirmation. Shortly 
after I was nominated, the Democratic Senate leader said he would “oppose me 
with everything he’s got”… And then, and then, as no doubt was expected, if not 
planned, came a long series of false last-minute smears designed to scare me 
and drive me out of the process … This has destroyed my family and my good 
name” (New York Times, 2018). President Trump, who nominated Kavanaugh, 
was very vocal in his support of him, apologising to Kavanaugh on behalf of the 
“entire nation” for the pain and suffering he had been forced to endure (Malloy, 
2018). 
Instead of an emphasis upon denying the allegations, or showing that the 
allegations were not true, both Kavanaugh and Trump seemed to focus their 
efforts upon establishing Kavanaugh’s claim to victimhood, the highest standard 
of defence. The media have reported Trump’s ability to “wield victimhood” as “his 
most powerful tool” (Noah, 2018). The case of Kavanaugh is not isolated. In the 
face of criticism, President Trump often appears to attempt to establish his own 
claim to victimhood, in fact it has been said to be critical to his popularity; “for 
President Trump, his state media and his cultish following, victimhood is central 
to their identity and critical to their mobilization” (Rubin, 2018: Paragraph 1). If 
this is true, Trump may have recognised that there is something special about 
the state of victimhood. If he can encourage others to acknowledge him as a 
victim, he will achieve a level of absolute credibility which comes alongside victim 
status. Trump also seems to use his very powerful position to serve out victim 
status like a gift to his allies and supporters. Those who are recognised by society 
as victims are often considered beyond reproach. This is not to say that Trump 
and Kavanaugh do not truly consider themselves to be victims, nor indeed that 
 51 
they are not victims, only that an insistence on being recognised as such is seated 
in the power available to, and associated with, victims.  
In fact, President Trump arguably owes much of his success to his ability 
to motivate his supporters through inverting traditional views about vulnerability, 
power and victimhood. Within his rhetoric there is recognition of the link between 
victimhood and power, and that certain groups of people who have at times been 
acknowledged as victims of discrimination, racism, injustice, and poverty, can 
benefit from a type of power that comes with a mixture of sympathy and respect, 
which society reserves for those who face some form of adversity. Recognition 
of the vulnerability of minority groups often results in an acknowledgment of the 
need to try to introduce policies to protect, or end policies which result in the 
victimisation of these groups. However, Bartlett (2016) proposes that many 
Republicans in the US see bias as a zero-sum game, where less discrimination 
against one group means more discrimination for other groups. He cites the 
following examples taken from quotes from US Senator Jeff Sessions, “Empathy 
for one party is always prejudice against another”, and former US Representative 
Michele Bachmann, “When you’re part of a favoured group, then you get special 
benefits that nobody else gets” (Ibid.). Bartlett believes that Trump has been able 
to tap into the victimhood that many white Republicans feel. These groups 
increasingly perceive the power that minority groups appear to benefit from 
through their claim to victimhood, as a threat to their own power, and this threat 
becomes their own claim to victimhood, through which they can reclaim power. 
Trump’s rhetoric helps his supporters to see themselves as victims of a “political 
tragedy centred around the displacement of “real America”” (Johnson, 2015: 
230). He encourages his supporters to see how a claim to victimhood from 
persecuted minority groups has given people in those groups power, and 
encourages his advocates to use this same pathway to claim victimhood for 
themselves, thus acquiring the associated power, and reinstating the original 
power dynamic.  
 The type of victimhood here is not necessarily a matter of law, but it 
requires the same public status. However, the public recognition of victim status 
need not be unanimous within a society. When the dispute is seated in the media, 
rather than in the court, no definite or final verdicts are drawn, and it is often 
sufficient to self-identify as a victim when faced with some allegation to prevent 
the accuser from gaining an absolute victim status, and from attaining too much 
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of the power within the situation. A small group of supporters who recognise the 
claim to victimhood is adequate, and with that recognition and victim label comes 
“morality, innocence and deservingness” (Jankowitz, 2018: 218). 
Such is the power that has become associated with a claim to victimhood, 
and the related moral superiority, bids to claim the label have become highly 
competitive, “victimhood has thus become a desired status” (Bilewicz and 
Stefaniak, 2013: 70). Recognition as a historical victim has become especially 
highly-valued (Ibid.), and members of groups who have been subject to historical 
injustice have been found in some studies to have a tendency towards taking less 
responsibility for their own wrongdoing because of their collective victimhood 
(Wohl and Branscombe, 2008). This further demonstrates the idea that people 
with some claim to victimhood can be consequently considered to be morally 
beyond question, and therefore, that a claim to victimhood can serve as an ideal 
response to an accusation of moral wrongdoing.  
 
2.vi. Can acknowledging one person as a ‘victim’ silence another? 
 
Rupert Butler, Counsel of 3 Hare Court, and associate of Henriques, described 
the policy of automatically believing victims before an investigation or trial as akin 
to assumption of the accused’s guilt until there is any evidence to the contrary. 
This way of thinking, he argued, results in three unacceptable consequences; 
that there is no investigation which challenges the complainant, that the suspect 
is disbelieved, and that the burden of proof is shifted onto the suspect (Henriques, 
2016).  
We have already discussed how a speech act performed by one person 
can affect the speech of another person, and in addition to lending some form of 
validation to the speech of a victim, how recognising a person with the title of 
‘victim’ may make a person’s speech acts more successful, for example, if the 
perlocutionary intention of their speech was to persuade.  
If the account of the accuser is accepted automatically, and the account of 
the accused contradicts the accuser’s account, the accused’s account cannot 
simultaneously be believed. Therefore, it could be said that the point at which the 
accuser is referred to as a ‘victim’, rather than a ‘complainant’, marks the moment 
the accused becomes disbelieved. Any statement uttered contrary to the 
accusation is, at that very instant, considered less credible than it was before the 
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accuser was pronounced a ‘victim’, and less believable than it would be in 
ordinary circumstances. Something has happened which impacts upon the 
accused’s ability to use their speech in a way which successfully convinces their 
audience. The speech act applying the word ‘victim’ to recognise the status of the 
accuser, has had an effect upon the speech of the accused, whose own account 
concurrently becomes less credible and less powerful than that of the victim, and 
less powerful than the average person.  
According to Austin’s Speech Act theory (1962: 116), when we speak we 
seek to secure “uptake” from those we are speaking to, our interlocutors or 
audience, but this uptake does not always take place, and we can find that the 
words we speak do not do what we intend them to; our speech act is silenced. 
The accused’s ability to use his words in the way he intends has been impacted 
by the perceived credibility of his accuser’s account. The increased credibility of 
his accuser’s account is a direct result of the accuser having been recognised as 
a ‘victim’ by a third party. We might say that the accusation alone does not impact 
his ability to perform certain acts with his speech, but the subsequent use of the 
word ‘victim’ by this third party when referring to the accuser changes the 
dynamic, and the balance of power between accuser and accused.  
 What sort of ‘silencing’ does the accused face? Which part of their speech 
is prevented from being successful? They are free to make whatever utterances 
they may wish. It may be the case that someone accused of a crime decides to 
be silent at the point at which their accuser is referred to as a ‘victim’; they may 
decide to wait for advice from a legal representative after being presented with 
the standard Police caution (UK) or Miranda warning (US). This is a choice that 
the accused is free to make. Perhaps the accused had been keen to protest their 
innocence, but upon hearing that the accuser had now been labelled as a ‘victim’, 
they would then feel that an attempt to protest their innocence was futile, because 
their guilt had been assumed, as Henriques argued. However, there is nothing 
preventing them from performing a locutionary speech act should they so wish 
to, so there doesn’t appear to be locutionary silencing.  
 Perhaps they face perlocutionary frustration, where the intended effect of 
their speech act is not achieved, for example, “one argues, but no one is 
persuaded” (Langton, 1993: 315). In speaking, the accused protests, which is the 
illocutionary act. They are successful as they are acknowledged to have 
protested. However, the intended perlocutionary effect of their speech was to 
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persuade, that is to say that by speaking they wished to persuade, but because 
the accuser has been recognised as a ‘victim’, and consequently their accusation 
deemed more credible, the subsequent speech act of the accused does not 
persuade. Perhaps they offer a counter explanation, but no evidence about this 
is available, and their version of events is not believed.  
Undoubtedly, a person who finds themselves accused of any crime may 
experience perlocutionary frustration in this way, but this would occur regardless 
of whether the accuser was labelled as ‘victim’ or ‘complainant’. It is the existence 
of an accusation which brings the suspect’s account into question, meaning that 
their words alone are not sufficient to persuade without evidence to substantiate 
them. We are not accustomed to having our account of our whereabouts on a 
particular occasion doubted in the manner that someone accused of a crime 
would face. When a friend asks how you spent your weekend and you deliver 
your account, you expect one perlocutionary effect to be that your friend believes 
that you did indeed visit the beach at the weekend. 
However, it is not the third party’s act of labelling the accuser a ‘victim’ 
which causes this silencing. At the most, we can assume that the application of 
the word ‘victim’ to the accuser could further the perlocutionary frustration of the 
accused, as it arguably deepens the doubt of their account, and makes it ever 
more likely that their perlocutionary act will be frustrated. 
 What about “illocutionary disablement”? Is there any speech act which is 
no longer available to the accused, in the way that divorce through saying 
“mutallaqa, mutallaqa, mutallaqa" is not available to women in the Islamic 
religion? Some may argue that the recent so-called “#MeToo” movement 
demonstrates that this is the case.  
 This movement became well-known in 2017, but originates from 2006, 
when Tarana Burke founded ‘Me too’, with the intention of helping survivors of 
sexual abuse find “pathways to healing” (Me Too, 2020). In 2017, an American 
actor, Alyssa Milano, used the phrase “#MeToo” on social media to encourage 
people to share their own experience of sexual harassment and abuse with one 
another. Millions of people responded, and the media was filled with stories about 
#MeToo-moments. Many considered the movement positive, “those who were 
silenced spoke, witnessing their voices amplified by the collective force of 
millions” (Gilmore, 2017: 1). However, as momentum appeared to build, and each 
day more men in the public eye were accused of sexual misconduct, concerns 
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were raised that because of the media frenzy around such allegations, the 
distinction between being accused and being guilty was being disregarded.  
Shortly before #MeToo hit the headlines, in 2015 Steven Galloway, chair 
of the University of British Columbia’s (UBC) creative writing program, was 
suspended from his role following allegations of serious sexual assault. The 
allegations against Galloway were made public before they were investigated, 
and author and activist, Margaret Atwood (2018: Paragraph 7), who became 
involved in arguing the injustice of the case, wrote, “The public – including me – 
was left with the impression that this man was a violent serial rapist, and everyone 
was free to attack him publicly.” 
Shortly after the allegations were made, UBC commissioned an 
independent investigation into the claims, which was undertaken by former 
Supreme Court Judge Mary Ellen Boyd (UBC Accountable, 2016). Six months 
later, the University fired Galloway from his role. Later it transpired that Judge 
Boyd had found that ““based on the balance of probabilities” the incidents likely 
didn’t happen” (Mason, 2018), although Galloway did admit to having had a two-
year affair with the individual who had made the allegations.  
Atwood was one of the signatories to an open letter, “UBC Accountable”, 
requesting an investigation into the treatment of Galloway. Atwood (2018: 
Paragraph 10), among others, compared the treatment of Galloway to the Salem 
Witch Trials, “in which you were guilty because accused.” Galloway later said, 
“It’s a totalitarian state when a finger pointed is automatically guilt” (cited in 
Mason, 2018). For many people, Judge Boyd’s verdict with regard to the sexual 
offences was not sufficient to exonerate Galloway. In fact, Atwood (2018: 
Paragraph 8) claimed, “the not-guilty verdict displeased some people. They 
continued to attack”. Galloway later disclosed, “even to this day there are people 
out there who have the audacity to say I got away with it” (cited in Mason, 2018).  
Due to the nature of the alleged offences, no other witnesses were present 
and only two accounts were available, the accuser’s and the accused’s. To many, 
the accuser had been a ‘victim’ right from the outset, and due to this dogmatic 
approach, there was nothing that Galloway could say that could count as a 
defence. The recognition of his accuser as a ‘victim’ meant that certain 
illocutionary acts were no longer available to him. His speech was silenced, while 
his words did not become inaudible, the utterances he made were deprived of 
illocutionary force, “preventing those utterances from counting as the actions they 
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were intended to be” (Langton, 1993: 316). Moreover, it was the very recognition 
of the accuser as a ‘victim’ from the point of making the accusation that resulted 
in this illocutionary disablement of the accused.  
This example suggests that, at least in some cases, Butler may be correct 
(Henriques, 2016), an approach of automatic belief has the ability to render the 
accused disbelieved, and the burden of proof can be shifted on to the accused, 
who must somehow find a way to prove a negative, evidencing that an event did 
not take place. The accusation itself becomes tantamount to guilt.  
I propose that this example would be represented on the Victim-Power 
Triangle showing both the Potential Victim and the Rescuer/Recogniser as being 
in balanced positions, since the Potential Victim’s speech has such power that it 
is able to influence the decision of the Rescuer/Recogniser, and the 
Rescuer/Recogniser’s speech in turn gives the Potential Victim’s speech 
credibility, while also having the power to declare guilt. The Alleged Perpetrator 
has been deprived of the ability to perform certain illocutionary acts, such as 
genuine denial, and therefore lacks the power available to the Potential Victim 
and the Rescuer/Recogniser: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V3 x C3 = P9 







When the letter ‘UBC Accountable’ (2016) was penned, the aim was to request 
that the University “establish an independent investigation into how this matter 
has been handled by the Creative Writing Program, the Dean of the Faculty of 
Arts and the senior administration at UBC.” Those who signed the letter 
expressed concerns about the fairness of the process: “UBC failed accused and 
complainants both” (Ibid.).  
Those who signed the letter were concerned that UBC’s treatment of 
Galloway perpetuated the idea that an accusation was tantamount to guilt. 
However, pointing out that an accusation did not necessarily indicate guilt, 
unavoidably opened up another possibility: the accuser could be making a false 
allegation. The signatories of UBC Accountable felt that by putting their names to 
such a letter they were being “fair-minded” and withholding judgement (Atwood, 
2018: Paragraph 9). Others felt that the letter was not fair, nor impartial, but 
misogynistic and equivalent to accusing Galloway’s accuser of lying. Atwood 
wrote the article “Am I a Bad Feminist?” in response to such accusations, stating; 
“now, it seems, I am conducting a War on Women, like the misogynistic, rape-
enabling Bad Feminist that I am” (Ibid.: Paragraph 1). 
My intention is not to examine here the full facts of the Galloway-UBC 
affair, nor does this dissertation seek to make any comment on the truth of any 
allegations made against Galloway. Instead, the case is presented to 
demonstrate the ostensible impossibility of entering into any useful conversation 
about impartiality from the moment an allegation is made. It appears that those 
who attempt impartiality, including resisting referring to the accuser as ‘victim’ 
prior to a thorough investigation, are seen as defending the accused; the situation 
is framed as a binary decision between committing to faithful belief of the accuser, 
and recognising their ‘victim’ status, or complete disbelief.  
However, this is evidently a false dichotomy. By supporting UBC 
Accountable, it does not seem that Atwood and her co-signatories wished to 
presume that Galloway was innocent simply because they did not want to 
presume that he was guilty2. Instead, they wanted to argue against any 
                                                     
2 It is interesting to note that as of January 2018, at least 10 original signatories of UBC 
Accountable have removed their names from the letter because of the reactions they received, 
despite remaining signatories insisting “It was never about questioning whether Galloway is 
innocent or guilty of the claims made against him or saying or implying that the complaints and 
the complainants were wrong” (cited in The Globe and Mail, 2018).  
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presumptions being made at all. If any point of view other than unreserved 
acceptance of the accuser’s account becomes instant defence of a potential 
criminal, we place potential victims in a bubble beyond the remit of rational 
examination. For those who recognise Galloway’s accuser as a victim from the 
outset, without waiting for evidence to base a decision upon, and for whom even 
an investigation finding Galloway not-guilty is insufficient to change their thinking, 
their use of the word ‘victim’ renders the ‘victim’s’ speech not only credible, but 
unfalsifiable. This dogmatic approach is clearly problematic, and leaves no room 
to account for those cases, no matter how rare, where the accuser is not a victim, 
and the accusations are false.  
This view represents an inversion of Blackstone’s ratio (1770), which 
states, “Better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent person 
suffer”, which instead becomes, “Better that ten innocent persons suffer than one 
genuine victim is not believed”. Atwood’s hope for impartiality seems more 
optimistic. However, is achieving impartiality as simple as just withholding 
judgement, as Atwood suggests? 
Many legal systems around the world are based upon the presumption of 
innocence, which is addressed in the European Convention on Human Rights: 
“everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law” (Article 6). This is clearly not a demonstration of 
impartiality, nor, I think, does it claim to be. If, when faced with an allegation, we 
presume the accused party is innocent of that offence, it seems to follow that we 
must presume that what the accuser says is not true, and consequently, that they 
are not a ‘victim’. For we cannot presume that the accuser’s account is true, and, 
at the same time, that the accused is innocent of the offence(s) outlined in the 
accuser’s account. Some argue that this gives the accused party a “super-
ordinate position” and the accuser a “subordinated status” with regard to rights, 
and further still, that these status positions can “inform judgments made 
throughout the process of justice including the reception of evidence” (Edwards, 
2012: 31). Of course, an investigation should be prompted by an allegation, so 
the presumption that the accused is innocent, and that the accuser is not a victim, 
is theoretically temporary.  
We saw earlier that Henriques has argued that to refer to the accuser as 
‘victim’ is to presume that an offence has taken place, and Butler claimed that it 
shifts the burden of proof to the accused; if it were otherwise, there would be no 
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victim. It is also, therefore, to presume that the accused is guilty, until there is 
evidence that the accusation is false. This is clearly at odds with the presumption 
of innocence.  
However, Henriques (2016) writes about wanting to achieve impartiality, 
but the presumption of innocence which he wants to uphold does not appear to 
have impartiality at its core. In fact, it would appear that the presumption of 
innocence concerns itself only with the fair treatment of the accused. The 
indictment that Henriques (2016) made regarding Bailey and his peers seeking 
to gain an advantage for complainants at the expense of those accused, could 
equally be made towards Henriques and Butler, and indeed our current legal 
system, in respect of seeking an advantage for the accused at the expense of the 
accuser.  
The power balance represented by the presumption of innocence, as 
depicted on the Victim-Power Triangle, would look as follows: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V1 x C1 = P1 
Alleged Perpetrator: V2 x C3 = P6 
 
 
The Rescuer/Recogniser, in this case people in a position to recognise an 
individual as a victim or reject their claim to victimhood, is at the top of the triangle 
as this decision rests with them. The person against whom an allegation has been 
made, the Alleged Perpetrator, has the benefit of the doubt during the 
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investigative and judicial process, so their account is assumed to be credible and 
true until proven otherwise. However, they do not have as strong a voice in the 
decision-making process as the Rescuer/Recogniser, as the decision to proceed 
with the investigation will be beyond their power, although their account being 
considered credible is a factor in the decision-making process. The Potential 
Victim has the least power in this scenario because the burden of proof sits with 
them, their account must be evidenced before it can be considered credible.  
‘Impartiality’ is beginning to emerge as another example of a word which 
is widely used, and considered to be widely understood, but which has different 
connotations for different groups of people. While Henriques (2016: 20) called 
doubt the “hallmark of impartiality”, Bailey argued doubt of an accusation was not 
impartial, but favoured the accused.  
For those who want to refrain from believing either party until an 
investigation is complete, as Atwood advocated with regard to Galloway, it is 
believed that withholding belief from both the accuser and the accused means 
the scales of justice will be balanced. However, Gilmore points out that, even at 
the point where only the account given by the accuser and the account given by 
the accused are on the table, the scales are often already tipped. This is 
particularly the case with “victims of sexual assault, especially the most 
vulnerable: Indigenous women, women of colour, young people, and trans 
people” (Gilmore, 2017: 2), because history has shown that accounts from people 
from these groups are less likely to be believed. Gilmore goes on to explain, 
“Woven into the application of justice is a cultural bias that says women are not 
as reliable as men, that they lie about sexual violence, ‘cry rape’ when they regret 
sex” (Ibid.).  
Therefore, if the aim of impartiality is to ensure both parties are treated 
fairly, siding with the victim might be required to even out the playing field. Refusal 
to lend support to either side inadvertently favours the accused, who is 
automatically in a more favourable position. If impartiality means treating both 
sides equitably, that does not necessarily entail that we must treat both sides 
equally. Equality is the outcome we should aim for, but is not always reached by 
treating all people in exactly the same way. This was meaningfully noted in the 
words of Holocaust Survivor and Noble Peace Prize winner, Elie Wiesel (1986), 
“We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim.” 
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It could be considered that to recognise and bestow ‘victim’ status upon 
the accuser, particularly in a sexual assault case where the potential victim 
belongs to a group who are often discriminated against, is to boost their credibility 
to counteract a system that will automatically favour the accused. If this is the 
case, considered in the light of the speech acts performed when referring to the 
accuser as a ‘victim’, the illocutionary act is to acknowledge the credibility of their 
account. In calling them a ‘victim’, you confirm that they have presented a credible 
account. The perlocutionary effect of referring to them as a ‘victim’, is to lend 
weight, to balance the scales of justice from the outset of the investigation. 
In terms of the Victim-Power Triangle, Gilmore would advocate for the role 
of Rescuer/Recogniser to lean towards the individual in the Victim role, 
particularly in the case of victims of sexual assault, where the victims are often 
more vulnerable. Gilmore would argue that failing to support either side during 
the investigative and judicial process, and remaining completely removed from 
the situation, would subsequently give an advantage to the accused; where 
Henriques considers this impartiality, Gilmore sees injustice.  
I propose Henriques’ traditional view of ‘impartiality’ would be presented 
as in the previous Triangle demonstrating the presumption of innocence. Again, 
the ultimate decisive power sits with the third party Rescuer/Recogniser, the one 
with the ability to recognise or validate the accuser as a genuine victim. Their 
failure to support the potentially vulnerable individual who has made an 
accusation, and instead remain detached from the situation will not result in the 
Alleged Perpetrator and Potential Victim being on equal footing, but more power 
for the Alleged Perpetrator in relation to the Potential Victim. The Alleged 
Perpetrator’s speech is more likely to be considered credible and true. 
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But for Gilmore, true impartiality, where the individuals on both sides are 
positioned equally, is to recognise ‘victim’ status from the outset, which spins the 
Triangle to put accuser and accused on the same level:  
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V2 x C3 = P6 
Alleged Perpetrator: V2 x C3 = P6 
 
 
The College of Policing (2020) sets out guidance regarding impartiality 
during investigations, within which it states, “treating everyone fairly does not 
mean everyone is treated the same”. This statement is open to individual 
interpretation. For those who reject the use of the word ‘victim’ during the 
investigation, such as Henriques and Butler, an example of two individuals being 
treated differently in the interests of fairness is the accused person being 
presumed innocent, and the accuser carrying the burden of proof. For those who 
see the value in the policy of believing those who come forward with a claim to 
victimhood from the outset, such as Bailey and Gilmore, the ‘victim’ being 
believed from the outset demonstrates fairness in the process.  
 
Power balance represented by impartiality – Gilmore 
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2.viii. The unfalsifiable victim 
 
However, even for those who believe that to automatically lean towards the side 
of the potential victim is merely a way to even the scales of justice at the outset, 
to avoid giving the accused a head-start, if no amount of investigation or evidence 
to the contrary will allow you to change your mind, your belief of the potential 
victim becomes unfalsifiable. 
 Bailey was careful to address this issue while advocating for automatic 
victim-recognition, and he made it clear that while he encourages an initial stance 
of belief, this must be followed by “an independent and impartial investigation” 
(cited in National Police Chiefs Council minutes, 2018). However, in the case of 
Galloway, for those who refused to take the investigation and findings of Judge 
Boyd into consideration, it is unclear if there is anything that could deter them 
from their belief in the testimony of Galloway’s accuser. In the rise of the #MeToo 
movement, many of those accused of misconduct or sexual harassment were 
not, and have not since been, subject to any investigation. However, even without 
investigation or trial, many of those accused began to feel the impact of those 
accusations.  
Just as Atwood (2018) had compared the treatment of Galloway to the 
Salem Witch Trials, in January 2018 an open letter was written, and then signed 
by over 100 influential women in France, which compared the #MeToo movement 
to “the good old witch-hunt days” (Chiche et al., 2018). This open letter, published 
in Le Monde, stated that the movement had led to a campaign of “public 
accusations and indictments against individuals who, without being given a 
chance to respond or defend themselves, are put in the exact same category as 
sex offenders” (Ibid.). This backlash against the #MeToo movement, supported 
by renowned writers, journalists, actors and other high-profile women in Paris, 
centred on the argument that the signatories did not want to be perceived as 
automatic victims just because they were female. For these women, while 
claiming to help and protect women, in reality the #MeToo movement would 
“enslave them to a status of eternal victim and reduce them to defenceless prey” 
(Ibid.).  
While one group of women saw the shift in attitudes as something which 
had the potential to redress a power imbalance between the men and women 
involved (Gilmore, 2017), giving women the power to be heard, to be believed, 
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and to call perpetrators out for their inappropriate actions, the other group saw 
something which only gave one type of power by taking another form of power 
away. This idea of power being acquired through a claim to powerlessness has 
in the past been called “victim feminism” (Wolf, 1994) or “fainting couch feminism” 
(Hoff Sommers, 2017). For this second group of women, the purported ‘power’ of 
being automatically believed, and taken at their word to be a ‘victim’, is not an 
advantage but an exchange. It is acknowledgment and recognition of ‘victim’ 
status in exchange for recognition as a fully autonomous and independent adult. 
Many of those writers who denounce this view of women as victims compare the 
treatment of women with attitudes toward children. For Hoff Sommers (2017) 
“victim feminism” stems from an “infantilized view of women”, while the authors 
of the open letter published in Le Monde wrote that those who advocate for 
#MeToo believe women to be “children with adult faces who demand to be 
protected” (Chiche et al., 2018). Contrary to Gilmore’s belief, for these women, to 
automatically recognise a female accuser who comes forward with a report as a 
‘victim’ is not to balance the power between accuser and accused, but to drive 
forward an unhelpful and inaccurate view of women as vulnerable and powerless, 
and then to compensate them with the power which comes with automatic belief, 
as a result of this powerlessness.  
For Atwood too, the assumption that when the accuser is female they 
should be automatically believed is not one that fits with a true feminist 
perspective. For Atwood, feminism is simple: “Women’s rights are human rights 
because women are human. It’s not a hard concept” (cited in Conroy, 2018). But, 
accepting that women are human, and equal to men, is to accept that they are 
flawed, capable of both good things and of bad things. “To be clear, some women 
lie. Why not? They’re human beings…If you take the false position that no woman 
ever lies, you’re just going to be shot out of the sky pretty soon” (Ibid.).  
If the #MeToo protestors are right, when we assign the ‘victim’ label to 
women at the point an accusation is made, we risk treating them very differently 
to other accusers. The illocutionary act of labelling an accuser as a victim right 
from the outset of an investigation is to declare the accuser’s account believed, 
and, in adopting this label too quickly where the accuser is female, the 
perlocutionary effect is to recognise women not as being equal to men but as 
significantly distinct from men; to brand women as powerless, vulnerable, and in 
need of protection. On this view, a strange trade-off takes place where women 
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are placed inside a protective bubble, granted a position in which their words are 
met with absolute and unquestioning acceptance, and yet this protection seems 
to result in a denial of recognition as an autonomous being with capacity for 
decision-making and responsibility.  
How would this view be presented on the Victim-Power Triangle? For the 
first time, the Potential Victim would demonstrate the most powerful position in 
the interaction, not only believed, but also protected and safeguarded against the 
Alleged Perpetrator by the Rescuer/Recogniser. Both credibility and strength of 
voice would be maximal for the Potential Victim. The Rescuer/Recogniser is in a 
position of power to recognise and protect the Potential Victim, while their 
credibility must be shown as lesser than the Potential Victim, whose status 
decrees their speech as having a distinctly special and almost infallible credibility. 
The Alleged Perpetrator will be shown as having very little power, their credibility 
is low, as someone who has been condemned as guilty merely by accusation, 
and they will find they have little influence over the decisions being made: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C2 = P6 
Potential Victim: V3 x C3 = P9 
Alleged Perpetrator: V1 x C1 = P1 
 
However, when the price of being recognised as a ‘victim’ is to concurrently 
accept recognition as a person who is inherently more vulnerable and in need of 
protection than others, the Potential Victim becomes very reliant upon the 
Rescuer/Recogniser, and in some ways seems to relinquish a certain amount of 
their own autonomy and power to the Rescuer/Recogniser. The 
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Rescuer/Recogniser remains the keeper of much of the power, and any power 
the Potential Victim has depends upon the continued recognition of the 
Rescuer/Recogniser. Therefore, there is an alternative view of the power 
dynamic in this scenario: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C2 = P6 
Potential Victim: V1 x C3 = P3 




Section 3: When victims are disempowered: The Rescuer 
 
In previous sections of this dissertation, the scenarios examined have 
predominantly centred around subjects who seek to be recognised as ‘victims’, 
and in most cases those who have appealed to a third party for recognition, 
triggering some form of investigation or review of the circumstances in order to 
determine their eligibility for ‘victim’ status. In terms of the Victim-Power Triangle, 
it has been the case so far that the triangle is instigated by someone who 
perceives themselves in the victim role, and the other characters are identified 
from that point onwards.  
However, in reality, recognition of victimhood does not principally rely upon 
the victim themselves reporting the situation, and as a society we have developed 
proactive ways of identifying potential victims of all manner of harms, and 
subsequently seek to safeguard them. This changes the commencement of the 
Victim-Power Triangle, starting instead with some individual or organisation sat 
firmly in the Rescuer/Recogniser seat, who then identifies Potential Victims and 
Alleged Perpetrators.  
Well-intentioned though such initiatives undoubtedly are, such 
undertakings highlight (but rarely ever seek to address) some very important 
issues around victimhood: When we consider if an individual is being harmed, 
whose idea of harm are we referring to? To what extent can an individual consent 
to being harmed without the perpetrator committing an offence? Should we use 
evidence of harm against a potential victim even when the potential victim does 
not want to make a complaint?  
On the whole, it seems positive to be part of a society that sees the 
protection of potentially vulnerable individuals as everyone’s business. For 
example, the Care Act (2014) sets out strict guidance which must be adhered to 
with regard to safeguarding vulnerable adults. Even outside of legislation, 
charities and other organisations campaign and raise awareness, encouraging 
members of the public to be aware of the signs that may suggest someone is a 
victim of domestic abuse, or modern slavery, for example. We are encouraged to 
be prepared to seek out victims rather than simply wait for them to come to us, to 
be the Rescuer/Recogniser. However, unlike the scenarios explored hitherto, in 
a situation where an individual is given the ‘victim’ label without actively seeking 
 68 
recognition or ‘rescue’ for themselves, there is a risk that this individual’s opinion 
about their own victim status is disregarded.  
This issue could be examined in one of two ways. The first is with regard 
to the question of moral relativism. Some acts are considered immoral within 
certain cultures, but are permissible and perhaps even encouraged in other 
cultures. For example, women who have been subjected to female genital 
mutilation are considered victims in Western culture, but not so in certain parts of 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia. So perhaps some women who have been 
subjected to this rite of passage would not recognise themselves as victims 
(though some most certainly would). As stated at the outset of this dissertation, 
it is beyond the scope of this particular discussion to enter into a debate about 
which acts constitute wrongdoing and when, consequently, an individual is or is 
not a victim.  
The second and more pertinent issue for the purposes of this dissertation, 
is the scenario in which an individual qualifies as a ‘victim’, for example someone 
who has suffered harm as a direct result of the actions of another, and perhaps 
even recognises and accepts this themselves, but does not want to receive the 
treatment or partake in the processes which are attached to victim status. This is 
a scenario in which rescue is not desired or consented to, but arrives 
nonetheless.  
An example of such a case is examined by Shelley Cavalieri (2011). In 
2003, the International Justice Mission, an American Evangelical Christian 
organisation, together with a coalition of local organisations and Thai law 
enforcement officers, raided a brothel in Chiang Mai, Thailand (Ibid.). The 
coalition referred to the event as a “rescue” (Ibid.: 1411). As a result of being 
“rescued”, the victims were involuntarily detained, despite not being charged with 
any offences, deprived of their belongings and savings, which were inside the 
brothel, and many were eventually deported back to Burma. The authorities 
identified these individuals as victims and, without their consent, they 
consequently removed these women from the situation, thereby making 
decisions about what would be in the best interests of these individuals without 
seeking their opinions, or their knowledge about their own personal situation. 
Furthermore, in the case of those women who were then deported to Burma, a 
place they had fled from because of the danger they faced there, the authorities 
sought to “rescue” these women from one situation which they themselves 
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considered unsafe, but did not show the same concern about any similarly unsafe 
situation these women may then find themselves in as a result of the “rescue”. 
This suggests that the motivation behind the “rescue” was not an entirely altruistic 
concern for the welfare of vulnerable women, since their ongoing welfare did not 
seem to be the key motivator.  
 Cavalieri, who visited Thailand after the raid, gathering accounts from 
trafficked women, former sex workers, and social services providers, believes 
that the victims involved would have experienced these actions as “both harmful 
and alienating” and yet these actions took place “under the guise of rescuing 
them” (Ibid.: 1412). Furthermore, the women Cavalieri interviewed who had 
managed to escape the brothel before the raid took place reported that both they, 
and the women they knew who had been “rescued”, had been working at the 
brothel of their own volition. 
Cavalieri’s report of this so-called “rescue” mission in Thailand, in which 
the authorities made decisions about what should happen to the individuals they 
identified as victims, without seeming to take any consideration of the victims’ 
points of view, would be reflected on the Victim-Power Triangle as follows: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V1 x C1 = P1 




The Rescuer/Recogniser maintains complete power over the Potential Victim, 
making decisions on their behalf, which the Rescuer/Recogniser identifies as the 
best course of action. In the same way that the authorities who represent the 
Rescuer/Recogniser position dominate and remove power from the Alleged 
Perpetrator, the authorities who acted as Rescuers/Recognisers exerted their 
own power over the Potential Victims too, overpowering all involved.  
In this situation, where the Rescuers/Recognisers used the word ‘victim’ 
to label the workers in the brothel, the illocutionary act was to identify these 
individuals as vulnerable and in need of rescue. The perlocutionary effect was to 
make decisions on the behalf of these women, removing their ability to make 
decisions about their own future. In labelling them as ‘victims’, they grouped them 
as people lacking control in the situation they were in. By labelling them as 
‘victims’, they took all the remaining power away from these women, who had 
made a choice about their own lives, and had this option taken away from them.  
Reflecting back to the various connotations of victimhood noted earlier, it 
seems that these particular Rescuers/Recognisers have a view of ‘victims’ which 
closely aligns with definitions Fohring (2018) found victims themselves trying to 
move away from; weak, and vulnerable, someone who has been trampled on and 
could be trampled on again.  
A caveat is required here: Cavalieri (2011) explains that there are myriad 
perspectives about trafficking from the organisations and individuals working 
against trafficking in Thailand, and it is likely that some of those involved in raiding 
the brothel may have considered the illegal immigration status of the workers as 
the main issue, thereby viewing the sex workers are perpetrators of immigration 
offences before considering their victim status.  
 
3.i. Do all victims need rescuing? 
 
If these women truly were at the brothel under their own volition, it is appropriate 
to ask if they should be considered victims, and more pertinent still, even if they 
can be defined as ‘victims’, if they required ‘rescue’.  
There are all manner of reasons why women may enter into sex work. I 
propose that each of these numerous reasons can be categorised as one of the 
following: the woman made a choice, or she had little choice. It is true that many 
women end up working in the sex industry against their will, often as a result of 
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human trafficking. These women suffer significant harm as a result of the actions 
of the traffickers, and certainly fall into the definition of ‘victim’. It is likely that the 
majority of women who suffer these experiences would agree that they are 
victims.  
However, a woman may choose to work in the sex industry because she 
can earn more money this way than she could in other professions, or perhaps 
even because she finds the idea exciting. Nussbaum (1998) has written 
extensively about the reasons behind the stigma attached to sex work. For 
Nussbaum, if a woman with plenty of alternative choices chooses to engage in 
sex work, this should not bother us as members of society. Only those women 
who have little choice, or whose choices are heavily constrained by lack of 
alternative options, should cause us any concern (Ibid.).  
The purpose of my exploring the example of women working in the sex 
industry is not to engage in a discussion about the ethics surrounding the sex 
industry. There is plenty of literature in which feminist academics argue that sex 
work is empowering (Klinger, 2003; Zatz, 1997), while others argue that it is 
always and essentially exploitative (Barry, 1995; Dworkin, 1993; MacKinnon, 
2007) and some have compared it to paid rape (Raymond 1995). While it may 
well be the case that some women (and indeed men) enter into sex work wholly 
voluntarily, while having the option to enter into other forms of employment, as 
this dissertation centres on victimhood, the focus here will be upon women who 
are working in this industry with little choice. 
In the case of the brothel raided in Chiang Mai, if reports from the women 
who spoke with Cavalieri are true, the workers were free to come and go, they 
were not in debt bondage, and they were there by choice. Therefore, it follows 
that there was some alternative choice for these women; they could have decided 
not to work at the brothel. However, if the alternative to working at the brothel 
was not to work at all, and consequently to be unable to raise enough money to 
survive, it is certainly debatable whether their decision to work at the brothel 
represents true choice. If alternative options are not truly feasible, the women are 
arguably bound to the brothel not physically, nor by fear or debt bondage, but by 
the reality of their situation. As MacKinnon (2007: 159) remarks, “If prostitution is 
a free choice, why are the women with the fewest choices the ones most often 
found doing it?". 
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Certainly, lack of alternative is a very troubling issue when it comes to 
consent; extreme poverty is very coercive. The women in question were 
predominantly ethnically Shan women from Burma. They originated from an area 
stricken with poverty, and social service workers who spoke with Cavalieri (2011) 
explained that, as these women were members of the Shan indigenous group, 
back home they faced a high risk of detention and rape at the hands of officers 
of the Burmese junta. Travelling to Thailand to work in a brothel represented a 
chance to escape the authorities in Burma, and to earn money to send home to 
their families.  
It is important to remember that, even when options are limited, choices 
between those limited options can still be made. Perhaps it is difficult to compare 
the choices made by these women to the sorts of choices we make every day; 
there seems to be something about the nature of ‘choice’ which is not satisfied in 
this scenario. We can imagine that if these women had more choices they would 
not be working in a brothel, but that does not seem to preclude them from having 
made a choice in this situation, limited as the options may have been.  
Others would disagree with this view, arguing that such is the exploitative 
nature of sex work, it is impossible to say that someone has consented to it. Barry 
(1995) states that nobody can consent to violation, and argues that inability to 
see any alternative does not equate to consent. MacKinnon (2011: 298) suggests 
that sexually abused and exploited children, who cannot consent to being in the 
sex industry, are no different to the sexually exploited women, because in many 
cases “they are the same group of people at two points in time”. MacKinnon’s 
argument certainly seems reasonable, a woman who has been in the sex industry 
since she was a child does not suddenly continue to work in the industry in a 
different capacity at the very moment she turns 18 years old. It seems 
nonsensical to imagine that on one day the men who profit from her are exploiting 
her but the next, the day of her 18th birthday, it is no longer exploitation.  
While Barry and MacKinnon make interesting and thought-provoking 
points about the issues at hand here, I believe it would be a mistake to overlook 
the fact that women, such as those in the Thai brothel, have made a choice; they 
have proactively sought out an improved situation for themselves. To dismiss or 
disregard this choice because the options were limited is to enormously under-
value the difficultly, the importance and the bravery behind the decision to leave 
their homes and travel to Thailand. These women alone are in a unique position 
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to see all the possibilities they feel are available to them, to weigh them up, and 
to decide how they wish to proceed. While the choice is limited, and the options 
available each present them with danger and a level of personal intrusion difficult 
to imagine, a choice has been made nonetheless. Undeniably, it is not a very free 
decision, and while all decisions have finite alternatives, the constraints of these 
limited options cannot be ignored, but with the alternatives being the threat of 
starvation through poverty, or staying in Burma to face discriminatory abuse from 
the authorities, the choice to work in the brothel has a certain “logic” Cavalieri 
(2011: 1412). These women are able to use their autonomy in the face of each 
scenario to garner some power over their situation, to weigh up the pros and 
cons, and to make a choice. They could have acted otherwise, but they chose 
which path to take. 
 I believe it is important to distinguish between three categories of women 
working in the sex industry; (i) those women who were forced into the sex industry 
through trafficking, and prevented from exercising any choice, (ii) those women 
who may initially have decided to enter into this industry and now want to leave, 
but are prevented from doing so through physical force, debt bondage, or fear, 
and (iii) those women who are not prevented from leaving, but choose to continue 
to work in the sex industry because, in their opinion, it represents the better option 
of the few available to them.  
 While women from each category may be described as victims – perhaps 
of poverty, racial discrimination, human trafficking and sexual exploitation – they 
do not all require the sort of immediate intervention which could be described as 
‘rescue’. What differentiates these three groups of women is that some of them 
lack alternative, while others do not. Those who have been prevented from 
making the choice to leave their situation would likely welcome the intervention 
of a third party, to take up the Rescuer/Recogniser role on the Victim-Power 
Triangle, and facilitate in redistribution of power. The Rescuer/Recogniser in this 
situation needs to take care to act in a way which empowers the victim, giving 
them the power to make decisions and act upon those decisions. However, 
women who are there because they’ve chosen to be would not welcome the 
interference of a Rescuer/Recognisor, who might consequently limit the options 
available to the victim further by removing them from their current situation.  
From outside of a situation, of course, it is almost impossible for any third 
party to know if victims have chosen to be somewhere, or if they are being held 
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there against their will. Therefore, it is important for those in the 
Rescuer/Recogniser position to provide a safe space to all victims, removed from 
those who may be acting in the Alleged Perpetrator role, so that they can freely 
make and convey decisions about whether they want help to be removed from a 
situation. It is equally important to respect the decisions made by these women, 
if there is no reason to doubt their freeness or mental capacity to make such a 
decision, even if the decision is not what the Rescuer/Recogniser thinks is in the 
best interest of the victim.  
In the case of the Thai authorities who sought to rescue the workers in the 
brothel, it is not known if the women’s ability to make a choice to be there was 
taken into consideration at all in the ‘rescue’ mission. Often it is the case that we 
project our own values onto a situation and make assumptions that these values 
and preferences are objectively held. Rescuers/Recognisers may presume to 
understand the choices any individual would make within a given scenario, and 
further, may assume that any decision a victim makes which is contrary to their 
own value demonstrates a lack of mental capacity to make appropriate and 
informed decisions. Therefore, they assume that victims want to be removed from 
a situation, and ‘rescued’ in the way they deem best, and even if these victims do 
not want to be removed from the situation, it is the place of the 
Rescuer/Recogniser to do so, in their best interest, overruling any opposing 
preference. This being so, in either circumstance it would therefore have been 
considered unnecessary for the Thai authorities to consult the victims as to their 
preferences.  
Similar reactions to sex work are seen around the world. Connelly (2015: 
155) argues that in UK, anti-trafficking non-government organisations seem to be 
rooted in “benevolence” at first glance, but are also often coming from an 
“abolitionist ideological standpoint”, from which it is assumed that those involved 
in the industry both “require and desire rescue”.  
In truth, it is not always possible for a third party to comprehend fully the 
complexities of the situation or the alternative choices open to someone, nor, 
therefore, what is in the victim’s best interest. If the Rescuer/Recogniser seeks to 
empower the victim, this entails creating the conditions in which the victim is given 
the opportunity to make their own decision about their future, and accepting that 
the victim has the right to make a decision which differs from that which the 
Rescuer/Recogniser would make, and even which the Rescuer/Recogniser may 
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consider ‘unwise’. In the UK, the Mental Capacity Act (2005) states that, in 
deciding whether someone has the capacity to make a decision, it is only relevant 
to ask if they can understand the information relevant to the decision they need 
to make, if they are able to retain that information for the length of time it takes to 
make that decision, and if they are able to use or weigh up that information as 
part of the process of making the decision. It is not appropriate to assess the 
validity of their decision upon whether it is a decision which anyone else would 
make, or whether the decision the individual makes might be described by 
someone else as “unwise” (Ibid.). We each have rights to make decisions for 
ourselves, based on our preferences, without the need to consult other members 
of society to adjudicate the objective wisdom of our decision.  
If the identified Potential Victim does not wish for intervention once they 
have been given the opportunity and space to access support, this is not to say 
the Rescuer/Recogniser should not act at all. ‘Rescue’ can be looked at from a 
more macro-level approach, exploring ways to improve the situations which have 
led to victims becoming victims, and ways to improve life for victims such that 
they will experience more alternative options opening up for them in the future. In 
this way, the Rescuer/Recogniser does not overpower the victim, but empowers 
and provides opportunities for the victim to continue to be more empowered in 
future3.  
This means the power within the Victim-Power Triangle is transferred from 
the Alleged Perpetrator, through the intervention of the Rescuer/Recogniser, to 
the benefit of the Potential Victim, moving from Position 1 to Position 2: 
                                                     
3 Nussbaum and Cavalieri each provide their own ideas about approaches they would advocate 
in order to empower women working in the sex industry. An exploration of these ideas, among 





Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V1 x C1 = P1 
Alleged Perpetrator: V2 x C1 = P2 
 
Position 2: 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V3 x C3 = P9 
Alleged Perpetrator: V1 x C1 = P1 
 
 
3.ii. ‘Victimless’ prosecution  
 
A clear omission from the discussion so far is the question of prosecuting the 
Alleged Perpetrator. The focus is not often solely on the Potential Victim. In this 
example above, those who sit within the Alleged Perpetrator role of the Victim-
Power Triangle have committed a criminal offence. In reality, the individual, group 
or authorities who take up the Rescuer/Recogniser role are also likely to be 
engaged in an investigatory and law enforcement capacity.  
In the example of raiding a brothel, these two separate roles do not 
necessarily present any conflict for the Rescuer/Recogniser who wants to allow 
the Potential Victim to make their own choice about supporting a criminal case 
against the Alleged Perpetrator, because the offence of managing a brothel could 
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be proven without individual victim testimony. For example, evidence that an 
individual owned or was leasing the premises, evidence found within those 
premises, evidence of proceeds made from the business, and so on. While it 
would be likely to strengthen the case if victims were to support prosecutors by 
providing their account, it is likely prosecution can go ahead without. Therefore, 
if the Potential Victim wishes to remove themselves from the situation, not to 
share their experience, even to continue to work within the sex industry, their 
decision does not hinder the prosecution of the Alleged Perpetrator.  
There are instances, however, in which prosecution of the Alleged 
Perpetrator and identification of the Potential Victim are necessarily linked. This 
is usually the case where the crime committed is against one particular individual, 
and there is little or no corroborating evidence of the harm. Criminal investigations 
of domestic abuse exemplify this, and such cases raise complex dilemmas for 
those people who sit within the Rescuer/Recogniser role of the Victim-Power 
Triangle.  
Dempsey (2009), a former domestic violence prosecutor in the US, 
explored this dilemma in her own ‘Philosophical Analysis’. Dempsey describes a 
radical shift in the approach towards prosecuting domestic violence, moving from 
the traditional view, “wherein such cases are typically dismissed unless the victim 
insists upon prosecution”, to a new approach of “pro-prosecution” or “mandatory 
prosecution”, “wherein the victim's request for dismissal is disregarded in 
prosecutorial decision-making” (Ibid.: 4). Dempsey herself implemented such 
policies while working in a specialist Domestic Violence Prosecution Unit, and 
states, “the scope of domestic-violence cases was defined broadly; charging 
decisions were taken irrespective of the victims’ wishes; witness subpoenas were 
routinely issued for victims to testify in court; and charges were not dismissed 
pursuant to the victims’ requests” (Ibid.).  
To provide some context for this discussion, in the UK, prosecutors make 
a decision about whether to pursue prosecution with regard to the Full Code Test 
(CPS, 2018). This test has two stages, firstly, the Evidential Sufficiency Test, 
which examines whether there is enough evidence for a successful prosecution, 
and secondly, the question of whether the prosecution is in the public interest. 
For example, in the case of a physical altercation between two acquaintances, 
where neither participant was left with significant injury, and where one party 
reports the incident to the Police, the normal investigative procedure would be 
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instigated. During the course of any subsequent investigation, the Police may find 
corroborating evidence, statements from witnesses or CCTV footage, for 
example, which corroborate the account provided by the reporting party. 
However, if this individual later decides to withdraw their complaint, it is unlikely 
the Police would continue to investigate or go on to prosecute the other party, 
even if there is strong evidence. Although it may be possible to meet the 
evidential test without the reporting party’s statement, it is not likely to be 
considered in the public interest to pursue the case because the Potential Victim 
has not been seriously harmed, and the Alleged Perpetrator is unlikely to be a 
threat to the public.  
For victims of domestic abuse, the decision to withdraw a complaint is less 
likely to be heeded by Prosecutors, due to the seriousness of this offence. 
Dempsey (2009: 4) claims that, at any given time “up to 85 per cent of the named 
victims in my caseload requested dismissal of charges against their alleged 
batterers” and the majority of these requests were refused. It is important to note 
that Prosecutors do not act solely on behalf of the victim, but in the public interest, 
so the more serious the crime, the more likely they are to pursue prosecution, 
and this is not limited to domestic abuse. It has been proposed that prosecution 
of domestic abuse cases should be perceived not as individual cases, but part of 
establishing on a wider socio-cultural scale that perpetrators of domestic abuse 
will not be allowed to get away their actions (Hanna, 1996), and will be held 
accountable (Ogden, 1998). No-drop policies are seen as the antidote to the 
historic view that domestic abuse is a private matter, recognising instead that 
there are wider social costs, in addition to the experience of the particular victim; 
“Each time a man hits a woman and gets away with it, all women suffer, both from 
the risk of harm that has not been prevented, and from the retardation of the 
movement toward societal equality” (Robbins, 1999: 207). The evidence-based 
approach moves domestic abuse from a private issue into the public realm 
(Nichols, 2014). 
This evidence-based approach is also intended to protect victims in cases 
where they may feel pressured by the perpetrator to request that charges are 
dropped, or to withdraw their statement, despite actually wanting their abuser to 
face punishment. It is common for victims of domestic violence who are afraid of 
reprisals to withdraw their complaints, later claiming either that the incident did 
not occur, that it was less serious than previously alleged, or that it was their own 
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fault (Edwards, 2012). These retractions are “well-recognised survival strategies” 
(Ibid.: 47). It is recognised that in cases in which the victim experiences ongoing 
fear of the alleged perpetrator this will have a significant impact upon normal 
investigative and judicial proceedings. In making a judgement on ‘R v Horncastle 
and others (2009)’, the Court of Appeal made the following comments, “A witness 
who is in fear may be as effectively unavailable as a witness who is dead, ill, or 
overseas” (Spencer, 2014: 355). For this reason, special processes and 
procedures are in place to ensure that evidence provided by victims who are in 
fear can still be included and considered in proceedings.  
For example, evidence-based prosecutions often rely on ‘Hearsay’ 
evidence. ‘Hearsay’ refers to a statement made outside of the court, and such 
evidence is not commonly admissible in court proceedings because it cannot be 
cross-examined as statements made within the court can be. However, there are 
some exceptions laid out in the Criminal Justice Act (2003) which allow 
statements made prior to the court proceedings to be included as evidence: 
These are, if at the time of the proceedings the person who made the statement: 
 is dead (Section 116(2)(a)) 
 is unfit to be a witness because of their bodily or mental condition (Section 
116(2)(b)) 
 is outside the United Kingdom and it is not reasonably practicable to 
secure their attendance (Section 116(2)(c)) 
 cannot be found although such steps as it is reasonably practicable to take 
to find them have been taken (Section 116(2)(d)) 
 does not give (or does not continue to give) oral evidence through fear 
(Section 116(2)(e))  
(CPS, 2003). 
 
The above list is not exhaustive as there are also a number of common law 
exceptions, which allow hearsay statements to be included, including ‘Res 
Gestae’. Res Gestae statements are statements which are either made when a 
person is so “emotionally overpowered” by an event that the “possibility of 
concoction or distortion can be disregarded”, statements which are made 
accompanying an act which mean the act can only be properly evaluated in 
conjunction with the statement, or statements relating to a physical or mental 
state (Ibid.).  
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Res Gestae is more commonly called upon in cases of domestic abuse. 
These exceptions allow Prosecutors to use a victim’s words during the court 
process even if the victim does not come to court to give evidence themselves, 
and in some cases, even if the victim does not consent to their words being used 
within the court proceedings. An example of this is the case of ‘Lee Stewart 
Barnaby v The Director of Public Prosecutions (2015)’. The defendant, Barnaby, 
was convicted of battery against his partner, Gibb. On the day of the alleged 
event, Gibb contacted Police in three separate calls to Police, during which she 
stated that Barnaby had attempted to strangle her. When Police officers arrived 
on the scene, Gibb reiterated that Barnaby had tried to strangle her, and had also 
bitten her cheek. Gibb did not make a formal statement and refused to pursue a 
complaint. During court proceedings the Prosecution did not call on Gibb to 
attend court, but used the content of the recorded calls to Police and the account 
she had given to the Officers who had attended, which they argued were 
admissible under the principle of Res Gestae. This decision was upheld by the 
High Court during appeal, where it was found that “given Ms Gibb’s emotional 
state throughout the various conversations, the court was entitled to dismiss the 
possibility of concoction or distortion.”4  
The benefits to evidence-based prosecutions and the inclusion of hearsay 
statements in cases of domestic abuse are quite apparent. Victims of domestic 
abuse are quite often in a unique position, having a personal relationship with the 
perpetrator. There is a level of acceptance, forgiveness and desire to defend the 
perpetrator which is unlikely to be present in a case where the perpetrator of a 
criminal offence is a stranger, or not intimately known to the victim. As a result of 
the existing relationship, many victims of domestic abuse are known to question 
whether they are to blame for angering the perpetrator. Feelings of guilt or self-
blame are more prevalent in domestic abuse than for victims of other violent 
crimes (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003).  
Being victim to domestic abuse often contributes to a lack in confidence, 
“the self-image is attacked and weakened”, and the victim can feel guilt or anger 
at themselves for not being “robust” enough (Javier and Herron, 2018: 111). In 
turn, the victim can become less emotionally resilient, and may believe 
                                                     
4 Lee Stewart Barnaby v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] EWHC 232 (Admin), [31] 
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themselves incapable of the strength required to leave the situation, resulting in 
a type of adaptation and blunting of the abuse with false hopes of reprieve (Ibid.).  
Victims of domestic abuse are likely to fear the repercussions of pursuing 
a complaint against their abuser, and are often further victim to threats and 
intimidation (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). In domestic abuse cases, perpetrators 
have intimate knowledge of the victim, their family, and places they frequent. This 
intimate knowledge means that perpetrators are able to make more personal 
threats, for example, threats to kidnap children, or to report the victim to 
authorities with exaggerated or fabricated information that could result in children 
being taken away from the victim (Ibid.). Domestic abuse victims may also be 
financially dependent upon the perpetrator, which could provide additional 
reluctance to report abuse. Finally, in these cases, the victim is likely to have an 
emotional tie to the person causing the harm, and a desire to protect them from 
prosecution, giving a further uniqueness to domestic abuse cases.  
All of these factors mean that victims of domestic abuse are often more 
vulnerable, and in many cases less likely than victims of other types of crime to 
pursue a complaint against the perpetrator. In some cases, the victim may wish 
to support the proceedings, but undertake what Dempsey (2009: 17) calls 
“performative victim withdrawal”, in which they “make a public showing of 
requesting dismissal and/or recanting their statements” but covertly indicate to 
prosecutors a wish to see the perpetrator prosecuted.  
The strength of the evidence-based approach is that it takes the burden of 
the decision to prosecute from the victim, and places it with the prosecutors. This 
takes the control that the abuser has over the victim, and the usual methods of 
control such as threats and intimidation, out of the equation. Instead of allowing 
the perpetrator to extend their power and control into the courtroom (Corsilles, 
1994), the victim’s personal feelings are removed from the equation. However, in 
some cases, such as in the above example of Barnaby v The Director of Public 
Prosecutions (2015), the only evidence available for the evidence-based 
approach is the account given by the victim (be this in a statement, through 
recordings of calls etc.) and thus the evidence-based approach still puts the 
victim’s account very much at the centre of the proceedings. 
Some feminist academics argue that the evidence-based approach, in 
which the victim’s personal judgment appears to be overlooked, is grounded in 
“an unjustified paternalism” toward victims (Dempsey, 2009: 23). Victims may be 
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left feeling that at the stage the prosecution team are introduced that they lose 
control over decisions, “It was just a disagreement that went overboard. I had no 
control-they [prosecution team] took over” (Hare, 2006: 623).  
It is argued that those decision-makers who advocate for evidence-based 
prosecution appear to consider themselves in a better position than the victim to 
make decisions about the victim’s life, suggesting “the victim may be blind to the 
serious nature of violent domestic abuse” (Clark, 1987: 268). In an approach 
which appears ostensibly unique, the evidence-based approach treats the victim 
in a very unusual way, considering their preferences to be somewhat irrelevant 
to proceedings. Hall (2009: 262) compares the treatment of these victims as 
treatment of parties with reduced capacity, “somewhat akin to children or the 
mentally ill.” 
Such a blanket approach seems to provide little room to differentiate 
between those victims who may be undertaking “performative victim withdrawal” 
as Dempsey describes, due to fear of reprisal, and those who want to make a 
genuine withdrawal of support for the proceedings, based on their unique 
personal understanding of the factors of the situation, and their own weighing up 
of the potential outcomes, in the way that victims of other crimes are often free 
to. Moreover, it is claimed that there is little evidence that victims are safer in 
cases where they have no control over filing charges (O‘Sullivan et al., 2007). 
The debate about the conflict between victim-agency and evidence-based 
approach remains very active. Many advocates of evidence-based prosecution 
argue that victims of domestic abuse are not making a genuine “choice” when 
they refuse to support proceedings against the perpetrator of their abuse, and 
their decision does not indicate any “special understanding” of how best to deal 
with the situation (Robbins, 1999). It is of course important to recognise that 
decisions made in, and restricted by, fear are not the ideal decision-making 
circumstances we would perhaps hope for. However, it is also important to note 
that the victim and the prosecutor are in fact addressing two quite different 
questions; while the prosecutor may be concerned with asking if the prosecution 
of the perpetrator is in the public interest, the victim is unlikely to take such an 
objective view, and instead asks if they will personally be safe, what will happen 
to their children, how the bills will be paid, if the potential punishment truly fits the 
crime, and so on. 
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Robbins (1999) argues that the idea that victims should be given a choice 
about whether the perpetrator is prosecuted feeds into the dangerous 
misconception that victims of domestic abuse actually make a free choice to stay 
with their abusers, which in turn allows some portion of blame to be imparted on 
to the victim when people ask “Why did they stay?” given that there was a 
‘choice’.  
This begins to echo our previous discussion about constrained choices, 
earlier explored with regard to the sex workers in the Thai brothel. Robbins is 
right to distinguish between people making free choices, and people who appear 
to be making free choices, but where lack of alternatives have constrained them 
to the extent that they may feel they have very little choice at all. It does not 
appear to be a free choice to stay with an abuser if there are no genuinely viable 
alternatives, and women in this situation may need additional support. However, 
equally important to note is that while someone may have limited options, or their 
decisions may be restricted, this does not invalidate their ability to make a 
decision between the remaining options available to them. It does not follow that 
because a person’s options are limited when making a choice that any choice 
should subsequently be taken away from them entirely. Hall (2009: 262) argues 
that such policies are “predicated on an assumption that domestic violence 
victims withdraw complaints because of some form of reduced capacity”, rather 
than acknowledging a victim’s capability for making decisions based on rational 
and practical factors.  
 
3.iii. The freedom to make ‘unwise’ decisions 
 
Similarly to the ‘rescue’ mission undertaken at the brothel, the evidence-based 
prosecution approach, and use of Res Gestae statements, puts those people 
acting on behalf of the Prosecution in the position of Rescuers/Recognisers. To 
some extent, the Rescuers/Recognisers are deemed more capable than the 
Potential Victim of making a decision about what is in the victim’s best interests. 
The approach can appear paternalistic (Dempsey, 2009), perhaps even 
patriarchal (Dayton, 2003), and is quite uniquely applied to crimes like domestic 
abuse and sexual exploitation, which are offences of which the victims are more 
likely to be female (Office for National Statistics, 2019a). The implementation of 
such policies appears to perpetuate the idea that individuals recognised as 
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victims of these particular types of abuse are not capable of making their own 
decisions about supporting a prosecution in the same way that victims of other 
offences are generally entitled to. Furthermore, although making a decision that 
may seem to others ‘unwise’ does not indicate that someone lacks the mental 
capacity to make decisions, victims of these particular crimes are not even given 
the opportunity to make potentially unwise decisions, and thus appear to be 
automatically treated as someone who has reduced mental capacity (Hall, 2009).  
Considering this interpretation in terms of the Victim-Power Triangle, when 
the word ‘victim’ is used to label a person who has experienced domestic abuse, 
by a person with authority in this arena, and when Res Gestae is then employed 
in order to include statements the Potential Victim has made, even when this 
individual has not given their consent for this statement to be used, the effect is 
to silence the Potential Victim by causing perlocutionary frustration when in 
subsequent speech acts they attempt to persuade the Prosecutor not to pursue 
prosecution. Furthermore, it is not only perlocutionary frustration, but illocutionary 
disablement, since the Potential Victim attempts to use their speech to withdraw 
their statement, or deny the original account, but these are illocutionary acts 
which are not available to this person from the time they have been labelled a 
‘victim’. Once the victim of domestic abuse is recognised as such, their 
subsequent speech is less powerful.  
However, simultaneously, in relying on Res Gestae, Prosecutors have 
concurrently given the original statement(s) made by the victim an increased 
power, in declaring that “the possibility of concoction or distortion can be 
disregarded”, and therefore that that particular speech should be considered 
more credible than other speech. Consequently, the Potential Victim is not 
required to have this statement cross-examined, or questioned in the way that 
other statements given in evidence would be, which adds to the impression that 
the Potential Victim’s words have a heightened credibility.  
The Rescuers/Recognisers, who are the prosecutors in this scenario, have 
maximal power in this relationship, since only they are able to contribute to the 
decision about whether to take the case forward or not. The Potential Victim has 
minimal voice, as their views are not influential, but they have maximal credibility, 
since their original account is considered to be without concoction or distortion. 
The Alleged Perpetrator has minimal voice and credibility in this scenario, since 
they have no influence over the charges brought against them.   
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Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V1 x C3 = P3 




3.iv. Public interest vs individual interest 
 
It could be argued that these policies allow Rescuers/Recognisers to ‘rescue’ 
Potential Victims by giving power to their original claim, then subsequently 
disempowering them, and refusing to let the Alleged Perpetrator extend their 
power into the courtroom, but not by a means of redistributing power to the victim, 
but by continuing to disempower the Potential Victim themselves.  
I propose that this is in danger of becoming too narrow a view of this issue, 
however. As already stated, it is key to appreciate that Prosecutors are not 
considering the prosecution of the Alleged Perpetrator solely in relation to the 
identified victim. Prosecutors have a duty to consider the public interest of a 
prosecution. On their website, Humberside Police (2020) have the following 
statement relating to “victimless prosecution”, which they have linked uniquely to 
domestic abuse; “We strive to work with our victims and their wishes, however 
the police have to assess the risk to the public and the potential of serious harm 
reoccurring. We sometimes have to make the decision to progress with an 
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investigation despite the victim not wishing to put a complaint in when the offence 
is deemed so serious and we have enough evidence to progress without the 
victim contributing in any way.”  
In December 2019, television presenter Caroline Flack was arrested and 
charged with assault by beating. Police were alerted to the incident when Flack’s 
partner, Burton, called emergency services claiming Flack had tried to kill him 
(Swerling, 2019). Burton later issued a request through solicitors for the charges 
against Flack to be dropped, and Flack’s lawyer argued that Burton was not a 
victim, but a witness (Ibid.). Providing a further example of disagreements about 
meaning and connotation, the Prosecution responded by arguing that Burton was 
a victim since he had sustained a significant injury to his head (Ibid.). The 
Prosecution also introduced the recording of Burton’s call to the emergency 
services. As a result of the hearing, Flack was placed on conditional bail, with 
one of these conditions being that she was unable to have contact with Burton 
before the trial. 
Two months later Flack took her own life. Burton (2020) took to social 
media to express that, despite “asking and asking”, he had not been “allowed” to 
be with her. The decision to pursue the conviction, and the conditions of Flack’s 
bail were contrary to the victim’s wishes. However, these actions were deemed 
necessary as prohibitive and punitive measures for the intentional or reckless 
application of unlawful force to another person (CPS, 2020). It is likely that the 
testimony of the police officers who arrived on the scene, with their body-worn 
camera footage, the recording of the victim’s call to the emergency services, and 
the photographic evidence of the victim’s injury would have been abundant 
evidence of this act.5  
When a serious crime has been committed, Prosecutors have a duty to 
prosecute in order to protect the victim, to protect the public from any risk 
associated with the accused party, and to give a message that this behaviour is 
unacceptable. In some respects, from the point in time that the victim reports a 
crime, the evidence-based policy means that the burden of any further decisions 
is taken from them (Corsilles, 1994). The crime that has been committed is 
against the law, not just against the individual victim. 
                                                     
5 As was the case in ‘Lee Stewart Barnaby v The Director of Public Prosecutions (2015)’. 
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Yet, as previously submitted, victimless prosecution is more prevalent in 
cases of domestic abuse, where the victim is more likely to be female, while the 
approach taken to serious assaults which are not domestic in nature seems to be 
quite different. At the same time that the no-drop prosecution approach for 
domestic abuse was being introduced in the US (Dempsey, 2009), researchers 
in the UK undertook a study of victims of assault being treated in a local hospital, 
and the approach taken by the legal authorities towards these assaults. Contrary 
to the attitudes towards victims of domestic abuse, researchers found that even 
in cases of serious assaults the Police would not initiate an investigation until they 
confirmed that the victim actually wanted to make a complaint. In one case, Police 
were present as the victim was taken to hospital with a severely injured hand, 
while the perpetrator “about whose identity there was no dispute” was still at the 
scene, but the Police did not arrest the perpetrator until several days later when 
the victim confirmed he would like to make a “complaint”, which was considered 
additional to merely “reporting” the incident to the Police (Cretney et al., 1994: 
19). Cretney et al. (Ibid.) claim that in the cases they examined, “reporting an 
assault is one thing, 'complaining' quite another. It is this second stage in the 
process which commits the victim (and the police) to an investigation of the 
offence and, where possible, to prosecution of the offender.”  
Thus, a further disparity is demonstrated between the approach to 
domestic abuse cases and others. If domestic abuse cases must be considered 
with regard to public interest, and consequently, the victims do not get to decide 
if prosecution is pursued, then victims of domestic abuse appear to be held to a 
higher account than victims of other types of crime. Comparatively, victims of 
other types of assault seem to have a choice between simply reporting the crime 
and actually instigating an investigation, and the Police allow for these victims to 
have this discretion, despite the perpetrators of these crimes also being a risk to 
the public.   
Arguably, on this basis, the victim of domestic abuse does not have a 
weight taken off her shoulders, but she now carries the additional weight and 
responsibility of the public interest, and supporting the Prosecution with their case 
against the accused. In fact, domestic abuse victims have been prosecuted 
themselves for refusing to support the prosecution of their abusers, charged with 
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perverting the course of justice, and imprisoned.6 The trial Judge in R v Renshaw 
explained his decision to prosecute a victim, claiming that by refusing to tell her 
story she was striking a blow “not only at the Crown…but at the law. If they get 
away with that, others will follow…the whole process is destroyed, and the men 
concerned are encouraged to continue”, and that the victim was “failing the court 
of women” (cited in The Times, 1989 and The Independent, 2010). 
In making such a statement, this Judge places some of the responsibility 
for instances of future domestic violence upon the victim who refuses to engage. 
In his view, the victim who refuses to support the prosecution fails in her duty as 
a victim; fails to be a ‘good’ victim, fails to comply with her own rescue, fails to 
consider others, fails to conform with the processes and procedures in place, fails 
to be the ideal victim.  
I believe that evidence-based prosecution, used with careful 
consideration, is a positive and progressive policy, which opens up the possibility 
of prosecuting offenders who historically may have been protected by inciting fear 
in their victims. That it is used predominantly in relation to crimes of which victims 
are more likely to be female, but applied with more discretion in relation to other 
offences, could be perceived as paternalistic, suggesting that there is something 
about these female victims which makes this course of action more necessary. 
However, I would argue that the gender of the victims is not the relevant 
connection between the crimes where the approach is more commonly engaged, 
but instead that the use of this approach is more closely linked to the seriousness 
of crimes like domestic abuse and sexual exploitation.  
Nevertheless, however well-intentioned the policy is, to apply it generically 
looks like a refusal to consider taking the victim’s personal understanding of the 
situation or the individual circumstances of each case into account. Furthermore, 
the insistence these victims should have to carry the weight of the “court of 
women” in their decisions, places a responsibility for preventing domestic abuse 
onto domestic abuse victims. Additionally, the suggestion that victims can 
somehow ‘encourage’ men to commit domestic abuse is to suggest a causal link 
between the victim’s behaviour, and the commission of an offence by domestic 
abuse perpetrators. The comments made by Judge Pickles in R v Renshaw lay 
                                                     
6 R v Ashley [2010] EWCA Crim 2913; and R v Renshaw [1989] Crim LR 811 
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Section 4: Victim-blame and the risk of victimhood 
 
In Section 1, we briefly touched upon what Christie (1986) described as the “ideal 
victim”. Those who have been harmed, but who fall short of the attributes of the 
ideal victim, which include being weak (sick, old or young), carrying out a 
respectable task, and being harmed by someone unknown and ‘big and bad’, will 
struggle to attain victim status, and the associated sympathy and support, 
compared with someone who does look like the ‘ideal victim’. One of the attributes 
Christie (1986: 19) lists as essential for the easiest access to victim-recognition 
is that the individual be somewhere they “could not possibly be blamed for being” 
when they came to harm. The difference between someone who is readily 
accepted as a victim and someone who is less ‘ideal’, and consequently struggles 
to get the same level of recognition, is based in how clear it is to the recognisers 
that there is nothing the subject could have done to make themselves less likely 
to have been a victim, and therefore that there cannot be any blame assigned to 
them. 
Victim-blame has been shown to be more prevalent in cases of sexual 
assault and rape, and this has been demonstrated in a number of studies 
(Gurnham, 2016; Gray et al., 1993; Allison and Risman, 2013). Furthermore, a 
survey by Sprankle et al. (2018) found that respondents were presented with a 
newspaper article describing an incident of sexual assault, in the version where 
the victim was labelled a sex worker, respondents were more likely to assign 
higher levels of victim-blame. They concluded that this was demonstrative of less 
victim-empathy for sex workers. One reason for this is undoubtedly that sex 
workers fall short of the ‘ideal victim’ paradigm. They are not doing something 
‘respectable’ in the eyes of society when they come to harm, and often the lines 
between what is considered to constitute consent are further complicated by the 
introduction of money in exchange for services. Sex workers do not fit the Little 
Red Riding Hood (Walklate, 2007) idealistic picture of an innocent and virginal 
victim, and are therefore less likely to garner sympathy.  
However, I propose that there is another way this difference in social 
reaction could be perceived, which is not about higher blame for the sex worker. 
While neither the Little-Red-Riding-Hood-like figure or the sex worker deserve or 
should be blamed the harm they have endured, and while the perpetrator in both 
scenarios is entirely to blame for their actions, there is another significant 
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difference here from the point of view of the members of society (recognisers) 
hearing about both cases: the likelihood of the event. I propose that for many 
people hearing of these two cases of harm, and these two victims, the main 
difference is how likely the events were to take place, with the risk of a sex worker 
coming to harm being much higher because of the vulnerability which comes 
alongside working in the environment she works in. This is not a question of which 
of these victims is more to blame for the harm, but rather which scenario is more 
shocking because of the expected vulnerability to risk.   
There are many myths surrounding rape and sexual assault. ‘Rape myths’ 
are “attitudes and generally false beliefs about rape that are widely and 
persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression 
against women” (Lonsway and Fitzgerald, 1994: 134). These include blaming 
women for their own sexual assault (Carline and Easteal, 2014), belief that rape 
is caused by overwhelming sexual desire, and belief that women wearing certain 
forms of clothing invite rape (McGee et al., 2011). In May 2020, a US Senior Court 
Judge was removed from the bench after asking a sexual assault victim if she 
had tried to prevent being sexually assaulted by closing her legs, and asked her 
to confirm she had once worked as an exotic dancer (Parmley, 2020). Although 
the ideal victim concept has become less restricted over recent years due to 
“increased social and legal awareness of violence against women”, many still find 
themselves disqualified when providing their own account of sexual assault 
experiences (Randall, 2010: 397). 
In a study concerning victim and perpetrator blame, Landström et al. 
(2016) presented participants with four different scenarios of sexual assault and 
harassment, some of which described the victim as being “flirtatious”. The 
concluding remarks of the study stated, “this study showed that the participants 
attributed considerably more blame to the perpetrator than to the victim” (Ibid.: 
8). This remark represents an erroneous conflation of concepts. The study used 
several quite different concepts interchangeably, questions about the victim’s 
“blame”, “responsibility”, “fault” and views on the victim acting “improperly”, were 
all “summed” and recorded on the same ‘victim blame scale’ (Ibid.). However, 
there are important distinctions between these concepts. While there are 
undeniably some people who believe that victims of sexual assault can invite 
harm and are in some way to ‘blame’ for the harm they experience, such as those 
people who accept rape myths, someone who believes that a victim can have 
 92 
some responsibility for their actions within a given scenario, or that a victim may 
have acted improperly in that scenario, is not necessarily saying that the victim 
deserves any blame for any harm they later experience. Recognising that a 
person being subjected to harm does not render their preceding or subsequent 
behaviour without relevance to the situation, and recognising that a victim is an 
agent who has performed certain actions is responsible for those actions, and 
that these actions could be in some way relevant to later events, is a very different 
concept to the ‘blame’ which is assigned to the perpetrator of the harm. The 
perpetrator of harm has acted in such a way which constitutes wrongdoing, and 
is to blame for those actions. While contrastingly, the victim may have acted in 
ways, (in some cases unwittingly), which has increased their risk of being 
harmed. Even if the choice to act in a certain way is made with full awareness of 
the level of risk associated with this behaviour, and the individual is then subject 
to harm after taking that risk, blame is not an appropriate word. Acting in a lawful 
way, which could potentially render you more vulnerable to harm, does not 
equate to any degree of blame for harmful actions you then experience, which 
are performed by another person. 
If using ‘blame’ here is not appropriate, what concept captures the 
distinction between those victims who acted in a way which increased the risk of 
being harmed, and those who have minimised their risk of harm? Consider, for 
example, of an individual who is robbed while walking through a deserted 
alleyway at night. Despite warnings from friends about the risk of being robbed in 
this area of town, he continues with this course of action. Despite warnings from 
his mother about carrying valuable possessions displayed clearly in outer 
pockets, he does not alter his habits. In contrast, another man is robbed the next 
day. He is on his lunch-break at midday, and taking a walk through the park when 
the robbery takes place.  
Neither man has performed any action which is worthy of blame. The first 
man does not invite harm by simply walking in an alleyway at night, he may even 
have done so on previous occasions without coming to harm. However, in 
comparison to the man in the second example, this first individual has acted in a 
way which he is aware will incur a heightened risk of harm, and while he could 
have taken simple precautions to lessen this risk, he chose not to adapt his 
behaviour and continued in a way which was knowingly high-risk. This individual 
is responsible for his own actions and decisions, which he made based on 
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awareness of the situation. He is not responsible for the actions of the perpetrator, 
and therefore not responsible for the harm he has experienced. As Wallerstein 
(2016: 326) comments, “The idea of prior fault makes sense when discussing the 
offender’s liability, for he is the one causing harm. It does not, however, make 
sense to refer to (prior) fault when discussing actions of victims.” 
The conflation between blame for harm experienced, and responsibility for 
personal actions which increase risk, is hazardous. Without this distinction, any 
discussion about what a person can do to avoid a heightened vulnerability to 
harm is discounted as victim-blaming. Evaluation of victim-behaviour is then 
socially proscribed, and advice given to reduce vulnerability is seen as 
transferring blame from perpetrators of harm to victims of harm. Further, failure 
to distinguish between these views means that any studies looking at social 
perceptions of victimhood will group all discussion of prior victim behaviour into 
the ‘blame’ category, and the nuances of this distinction, and “the possibility that 
participants of the relevant research studies might have been expressing 
something other than victim-blaming attitudes” (Gurnham, 2016: 261) is 
potentially lost. 
The position I am advocating here, that a victim can be said to have 
responsibility over risk management, differs from other recently proposed views 
on responsibility and blame. For example, Curchin (2019) argues that victims of 
sexual assault are never blameworthy, but that it may be possible to identify 
choices they made that form part of a causal chain resulting in violence. Curchin 
proposes that the victim contributed to causing the harm, but is not morally 
responsible. However, I suggest, the scale of responsibility for increased risk of 
vulnerability to harm is entirely separate to the scale of responsibility for the act 
which causes the harm. Nobody but a rapist can cause rape. Rape cannot be 
incited; a rape victim does not in any way cause the rape, and crucially cannot 
cause the rape. Rape can only be caused by a rapist. A victim could potentially 
act in such a way as to put themselves at a heightened risk of vulnerability to 
being raped, and still not be raped, because the rape itself is entirely the act and 
thus the responsibility of the perpetrator. Unless she crosses paths with a rapist, 
she will not be raped. To say that a victim caused the violence by acting in a 
certain way, in my opinion, crosses into victim-blaming. Equally, Lamb (1996: 54) 
fails to identify this subtle but fundamental distinction when she proposes, “crucial 
to our dignity is being held responsible for things that have happened to us”. Lamb 
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conflates a person’s responsibility for risk management, and for their own 
behaviours, with responsibility for harm they experience. While being 
acknowledged as an agent with the ability to make choices relating to risk will 
inevitably mean we will be considered responsible for taking risks, this is not the 
same as being considered responsible for another person’s actions which cause 
us harm.  
A person’s responsibility for risk management should be calculated on an 
entirely different measure to any scale which looks at blame or responsibility for 
harm. In the case of rape, the extent to which a victim acted to manage the 
potential risk of harm is an unrelated variable to the question of responsibility for 
any subsequent harm. The two scales are incommensurable. A rape victim who 
took no precautions to protect themselves from being at risk of harm still cannot 
have any responsibility for the act of rape. 
 
4.i. Safety planning and victim-responsibility 
 
Why would it be necessary to distinguish between the preceding actions of the 
‘ideal victim’ and the ‘non-ideal victim’? After all, a person who has been harmed 
and recognised as a victim should not be treated any differently regardless of the 
circumstances in which the harm took place. The processes and the approach 
should not differ if the victim is considered to have acted in such a way as to 
increase their vulnerability to harm. Yet, the actions which lead to an increased 
vulnerability to harm are the key to the distinction, because the unfortunate but 
undeniable reality of our world is that there are people who will cause others 
serious harm, either with the intent of causing harm, accidentally, or as a means 
to another end. Awareness of this reality, and knowledge of how to protect oneself 
from harm is vital, and to some extent, some of this awareness and knowledge 
stems from the occurrence of harm, and the ability to review what can be done 
differently in future to mitigate risk of further harm and victimisation.  
If we accept that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, blaming 
a victim and holding them responsible to some extent for the harm they have 
been subjected to, and on the other, some evaluation of victim action and 
behaviour that may increase vulnerability to harm, where does this distinction lie? 
There is a risk, with the focus being too heavily on ways for a victim to avoid 
vulnerability to harm, that the onus is perceived to be on the victim to avoid harm. 
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If this is played out, the victim who is harmed may be told they did not do enough 
to avoid harm, and this looks very much like placing responsibility for that harm 
back with the victim.  
Examination of the actions that can leave someone more likely to 
experience harm, and consequent guidance advising people to avoid these 
actions, can quickly reflect victim-blaming. The analysis of patterns identified 
within reports of rape led to publication by the NHS and the Home Office of a 
poster which read: “One in three reported rapes happens when the victim has 
been drinking”, which was widely criticised in the UK as victim-blaming (cited in 
Gurnham, 2016: 259). It was argued that the focus on the victims rather than the 
perpetrators of rape, and suggestion that there was a link between the harm and 
the victim’s behaviour, was not appropriate.  
While the message of the poster had unfortunate connotations, I submit 
that it was clearly not the intention of the poster to say that those one in three 
victims were to blame for their assault. More likely, those who commissioned this 
poster thought it would remind people that when they have consumed a high 
volume of alcohol, they are more likely to be vulnerable to harm. With this 
awareness, a person might decide to take additional precautions to keep 
themselves safe when drinking alcohol. 
With knowledge that drinking alcohol could render them more vulnerable 
to risk, a person who chooses to drink has responsibility for accepting and 
managing this heightened level of risk when making further choices. However, 
their responsibility ends there, “that is all that it amounts to—prior responsibility 
(and prior choice) to putting oneself at risk, to becoming vulnerable” (Wallerstein, 
2009: 327), but not responsibility for any subsequent harm.  
Safety planning is a widely recommended intervention for domestic 
violence and sexual assault victims (Logan and Walker, 2018), and most 
organisations which support victims of these types of harm will include safety 
planning as part of their program (Davies et al., 1998). The reality of the risk they 
face means that plans to protect oneself are entirely necessary and appropriate. 
This does not mean that the victim is responsible for avoiding harm, nor that 
failure to avoid harm transfers any level of responsibility for that harm onto the 
victim. 
Safety guidance for women with regard to risk of vulnerability to sexual 
assault and rape, however, is often seen to cross the boundary, from 
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responsibility for risk management, to victim-blaming. Social media has been 
used to demonstrate women’s “fed-upness” (Rentschler, 2015: 354) with the 
focus on safety guidance for women, which has been described as “paranoia-
producing” and absurd. Advice about watching your drink and not walking alone 
after dark (Marwick, 2019) is often considered to be supporting the view that it is 
a woman’s responsibility to prevent sexual assault, while the focus should be on 
perpetrators. 
Common themes often emerge in relation to types of crime. For example, 
in the UK, statistics show that men are more likely than women to be victims of 
robbery and vehicle-related theft, and students are almost twice as likely to be 
victim of ‘theft from the person’ than the average adult (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017). Statistics also show that there is a greater risk of being victim to 
violent crime at night (Office for National Statistics, 2019b). Crime data is 
collected and analysed to highlight these patterns and themes, and this 
information is then used to influence policy and planning around crime 
prevention.  
Crime prevention based on encouraging potential victims to change their 
behaviour, in response to indications that certain situations lead to heightened 
risk, is referred to as situational crime prevention (Wortley, 2010). Most of us take 
certain precautions in our daily lives to lessen our vulnerability to crime, shutting 
windows when we leave the car, and locking the doors of our homes. It is 
proposed that the situational crime prevention approach can assist with “advice 
on what measures are most effective” (Ibid.: 886). However, this approach has 
also been accused of victim-blaming, “insidious social control”, creating a 
“distrustful society”, and enforcing the “status-quo” by accepting these crimes and 
moving focus on to victims preventing them instead of perpetrators (Ibid.).  
Aside from sexual offences, advice on safety planning and risk 
management for other types of harms is widespread, and often more readily 
accepted. For example, online-associated harms such as security breaches and 
fraud are significantly less likely if the internet-user takes precautions, and more 
likely if the user opens unexpected email attachments or links in emails, 
downloads malware, or uses weak passwords (Shillair et al., 2015). In fact, the 
internet-user (potential victim) is described as the key factor in online security or 
cyber-security (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; Davinson and Sillence, 2010). The 
high level of risk of becoming vulnerable to these online-associated harms means 
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that the necessity of talking about avoiding risk and our responsibility for avoiding 
risk is clear. This does not mean that responsibility for any actual harm is shifted 
from the perpetrator to the victim, but “enhancing a user’s sense of personal 
responsibility” is described as a “necessary precursor to effective online safety 
interventions” (Shillair et al., 199). 
In the UK, the Crimestoppers website (2020) provides guidance on 
keeping safe from crimes from vehicle theft to business fraud. The advice, 
interspersed with statistics and research, does not imply that victims of these 
types of harm who have not followed the advice are to blame for their 
victimisation, merely that there are ways to lower your vulnerability to these 
harms. What is different then, in the advice aimed at avoidance of increased 
vulnerability to sexual assault? 
One key difference is the existence of those rape myths already 
considered. The fact that victims of rape and sexual assault have so often been 
faced with the blame for their own harm, despite it having been inflicted by the 
actions of the perpetrator, means that attempts to look at risk reduction on behalf 
of the victims of these harms is more fraught and politically charged (Gurnham, 
2016). While comparatively no such clear history is present with victims of online-
based harms. Further, some anti-sexual assault advice for women is so closely 
aligned to rape myth that it does not stand alone, for example, advising women 
not to dress provocatively stems from the rape myths that rape is caused by 
overwhelming sexual desire (McGee et al., 2011), and that men are unable to 
control their sexual impulses (Henderson, 1992). 
Secondly, women are more likely to be the targets of advice on avoiding 
sexual harm (Stanko, 1996; Campbell, 2005; Fanghanel and Lim, 2015). Advice 
which encourages women to dress in a more conservative way, and to avoid 
certain behaviours, such as drinking too much alcohol, is considered by some 
feminist academics to reflect a patriarchal society which wants to police women’s 
behaviour (Fanghanel and Lim, 2015). 
However, similarly harmful myths exist in relation to domestic abuse, for 
example, that women in abusive relationships could leave whenever they want, 
but choose to stay (Robbins, 1999). It could equally be perceived that the idea of 
safety planning for victims of domestic abuse is putting the onus on the victim to 
look after themselves, moving responsibility from perpetrators to victims. But, the 
reality of the prevalence of domestic abuse, in conjunction with the hidden nature 
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of this type of harm, means that there is a need to work with victims to help them 
identify their risk of harm, and identify ways to avoid harm. To ignore the agency 
of victims of this type of abuse, and to dogmatically focus solely on the role of 
perpetrators in preventing domestic abuse, is idealistic, and an unhelpful 
eschewal of the practical reality. Women are also more likely to be targets of this 
safety planning advice simply because women are more likely to be victims of 
domestic abuse (Office for National Statistics, 2019a).  
The need for safety planning in domestic abuse is based in realism and 
pragmatism, and the victim needs to be at the centre of this planning, while 
supported by an advocate (Campbell, 2004). There is a very real need to help 
victims accurately determine their own risk, and victims themselves are often in 
the best position to judge their own risk of re-assault (Campbell, 2004; Goodman 
et al., 2000; Weisz et al., 2000). This approach in no way omits nor denies the 
need for a focus on perpetrators, and their responsibility for the harm they have 
caused. Indeed, there continues to be a strong focus on working with perpetrators 
of domestic abuse to support them to change their behaviours, and of course, 
strong punishment through the judicial process for those who commit domestic 
abuse. Some advocate for a more joined up approach where victims and 
perpetrators of intimate partner violence attend counselling sessions together 
(Stith et al., 2011; Almedia and Durkin, 1999; Bograd and Mederos, 1999) which 
both “addresses danger and uses the existing strengths in couples’ relationships 
as the basis for change” (Stith et al., 2011). While there have been concerns that 
this approach results in “erosion of personal responsibility” (Ibid.), if all such 
programs are considered alongside programs which focus on perpetrator 
culpability and the need for change then there is no reason that a joint focus need 
be mutually exclusive with recognition of perpetrator responsibility.  
Victim-blaming is a very real phenomenon and needs to be addressed 
when it occurs. It forms part of a culture where violence against women is 
normalised (Buchwald et al., 1993). However, avoiding all scrutiny of victim-
behaviour is equally damaging. Unfortunately, the line between a sensitive but 
pragmatic consideration of any victim-behaviour which could have led to 
increased risk, and mere victim-blaming can at times be quite difficult to 
distinguish. The alternative to talking about the existence of risk-avoiding 
behaviours is to entirely ignore the actions of the victim, to perform no evaluation 
of risk, and to merely report harm without putting any measures in place to 
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contribute to the avoidance of further harm in future. Perhaps not even to report 
on the actions of the victim to avoid any notion of evaluation. 
Applied to digital fraud, the idea of avoiding any discussion or sharing of 
information about activities or common mistakes which are known to increase a 
person’s risk of becoming a victim appears ethically irresponsible, and seems 
only to service perpetrators of these crimes. Safety advice is prevalent in our 
everyday lives; we find ourselves cautioned against approaching dangerous 
offenders7, engaging in fraudulent phone calls8, travelling because of dangerous 
weather conditions,9 because of health risks10, or because of a political 
situation11. 
 
4.ii. Victims as agents 
 
The consequences of proscribing talk about a victim’s behaviour are three-fold. 
Firstly, as previously mentioned, failure to examine preceding actions in terms of 
risk avoidance deprives us as a society of useful information about how to lower 
our risks of falling prey to these harms. Secondly, we give victims a special status, 
placing them beyond scrutiny and applying to them a reduced expectation of 
responsibility for their own actions. Finally, if we refuse to acknowledge that there 
are ever any actions that a victim could have taken to reduce their vulnerability to 
harm, we declare their actions inconsequential, reducing their agency.  
If applied particularly to women, because accusations of victim-blaming 
are more prevalent in crimes of which women are more likely to be victims, by 
refusing to acknowledge their responsibility for risk management, we treat them 
                                                     
7 An example: Merseyside Police (2020) Wanted: Conor Bayne [online] (2 January 2020). 
Available at: <https://www.merseyside.police.uk/news/merseyside/news/2020/january/wanted-
connor-bayne/> [Accessed 06 March 2020] 
8 An example: Pembrokeshire County Council (2019) Phone Scam Warning [online] (20 
December 2019). Available at: <https://www.pembrokeshire.gov.uk/newsroom/phone-scam-
warning-dec-2019> [Accessed 06 March 2020] 
9 Examples: Reines, J. (2019) ‘Don’t drive’ warning as Highways England issues severe 
weather alert for road disruption, Cornwall Live, 1st November. Available at: 
<https://www.cornwalllive.com/news/cornwall-news/dont-drive-warning-highways-england-
3494313> [Accessed 06 March 2020]; and BBC News (2019) Australia Fires: Travel warnings 
issued over ‘catastrophic’ conditions, BBC News, 21st December. Available at: 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-50876469> [Accessed 06 March 2020] 
10 An example: UK Government (2020) Foreign Travel Advice China [online] (4 March 2020). 
Available at: <www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/china> [Accessed 06 March 2020] 
11 An example: U.S Department of State (2020) Iran Travel Advisory [online] (26 February 
2020). Available at: <travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/iran-
travel-advisory.html> [Accessed 06 March 2020] 
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differently to men. We risk perpetuating the infantilised view of women decried in 
arguments against “victim feminism” (Hoff Sommers, 2017) explored back in 
Section 2. 
When considered on the Victim-Power Triangle, I propose that these 
outcomes would be presented as oscillating between two contrary positions: At 
Position A, the Potential Victim being very powerful, protected by their victim 
status, and their actions beyond scrutiny, but at Position B, the Potential Victim 
is considered as a someone whose actions have less impact than another agent, 
and someone who could not have been expected to, or was perhaps incapable 
of acting in any other way to protect themselves. The Potential Victim is always 
very credible, but their voice is less significant once they are seen as someone 
with a reduced capacity for decision-making, less responsibility for their own 




Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C2 = P6 
Potential Victim: V3 x C3 = P9 
Alleged Perpetrator: V1 x C1 = P1 
Position B: 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C2 = P6 
Potential Victim: V1 x C3 = P3 
Alleged Perpetrator: V1 x C1 = P1 
 
In both versions, the Rescuer/Recogniser will have the strongest voice, the most 
influence over decisions made in the course of any investigation. The Potential 
Victim will have the highest credibility as their account is accepted and their prior 
actions will not be questioned. The Alleged Perpetrator will have the least power, 
both in terms of voice and credibility.  
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In contrast, to focus on what we can do to protect ourselves from becoming 
victims, while still giving full acknowledgement of the perpetrator’s blame for 
harm, could be considered empowering. Ensuring that victims and potential 
victims are equipped with the skills and knowledge to safeguard themselves from 
harm, and recognising that they have the agency to do so, is to recognise them 
as able and powerful, rather than passive and essentially vulnerable. 
Again, it is necessary that the subtle but crucial distinction between 
responsibility for risk management and responsibility for harm is made. It is not, 
as Lamb (1996) proposes, being held responsible for things that happen to us 
which gives us dignity, but being recognised as someone who has the power to 
make decisions, and in turn accepting responsibility for those decisions. Lamb 
(1996: 55) suggests that a victim of multiple sexual harms should question what 
it is about them which makes men perpetrate these harmful actions, and this is 
how they should take responsibility. It is clear that Lamb conflates these two 
entirely separate types of responsibility.  
To accept that there are steps women can take to lower their risk of 
experiencing harm through sexual assault (Curchin, 2019), and that their choices 
regarding whether to take these precautions are their responsibility, is pragmatic 
and conscious of the social reality we inhabit. In a utopia, of course, no individual 
would have to take any precautions or alter their behaviour in order to lower their 
risk of interpersonal harm, because there would be no perpetrators of harm. 
Unfortunately, a situation of total safety, a “safety utopia” (Boutellier, 2004) may 
be desirable, but it is not attainable.  
It has been argued that women feeling that they should avoid certain 
activities or behaviours in order to avoid risk of harm limits their freedom; the 
obligation for women to keep themselves safe in public spaces is considered to 
be counter to the imperative to be free (Foucault, 2008; Delueze, 1992; 
Fanghanel and Lim, 2015).  
However, within a society, personal freedom does have limits. Restrictions 
on one person’s personal freedom are often required in order to allow another 
person a level of freedom. As Abraham Lincoln (1864) stated, when a shepherd 
drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, the sheep considers this liberty, but the 
wolf will consider this as a prevention of liberty. In order to create a society in 
which we can be free enough to thrive, we have had to introduce boundaries 
which ensure our safety, “Vitality and safety are two sides of the same coin” 
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(Boutellier 2004: 2). We are left with a paradox, in order to enjoy our freedom, we 
must accept boundaries. Proactive and defensive behaviour may feel like a 
limitation on total freedom, but undertaking these actions and thus limiting our 
risk vulnerability to harm allows us to continue enjoying other freedoms.  
 
4.iii. A duty to protect 
 
There is another party to consider when we think of responsibility for reducing a 
potential victim’s risk of vulnerability to harm; those same people who may 
perform the role of Rescuer/Recogniser, the members of our society. 
The Victim-Power Triangle has demonstrated already the importance of 
the role of the Rescuer/Recogniser. In all variations of the Triangle it has been 
the variance of views and reactions of the person or people in the role of 
Rescuer/Recogniser that has had the greatest bearing upon the power dynamic 
between the three positions, and the power of the Potential Victim’s speech. It is 
the role of the Rescuer/Recogniser, who are members of society, members of 
juries, representatives of organisations and political groups, to take responsibility 
for bringing perpetrators of harm to justice, to analyse and research risk and 
share these findings and recommendations with other members of society, to 
fund and implement protective measures to lower risk, to provide education and 
support to enable perpetrators and potential perpetrators to change their 




Section 5: What do we want for victims? 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have demonstrated that there are many different 
and sometimes opposing ideas associated with the concept of victimhood; who 
can be a victim, when someone becomes a victim, how we should react towards 
victims, and who is responsible for a person’s victimhood. These different views 
influence how the victim is treated, and to what extent their voice and opinions 
are considered when making decisions. I have argued that it is the speech act of 
whomever is in that Rescuer/Recogniser role, the act of labelling the individual a 
‘victim’, which directly affects the voice of the victim, and what they are able then 
to do with their words. In some circumstances, the act of calling the individual a 
‘victim’ will amplify the voice of that individual; it will allow their words to mean 
more, to do more. This means that being recognised as a ‘victim’ can be 
desirable. In some circumstances, the act of the calling the individual a ‘victim’ 
will take power away from the individual by stifling their voice and the actions 
available to them through their speech, and depriving them of autonomy.  
 In the latter section I have suggested that fear of victim-blaming can 
prevent even basic levels of evaluation of an individual’s actions preceding their 
experience of harm, and that while victim-blaming is an unfortunately prevalent 
and harmful exercise, not all discussions about a victim’s actions seek to 
apportion blame for the harm experienced. Evaluation of all events leading up to 
the point of harm allows us to understand risk to that victim, and to other members 
of society.  
Having discussed what effects the ‘victim’ label can have upon an 
individual, their ability to do certain things with their speech, and to successfully 
perform certain speech acts, in this final section I want to question what effects 
we would ideally want the ‘victim’ label to have upon an individual, by considering 
what the power dynamic should look like between Victim, Perpetrator and 
Rescuer/Recogniser, and to identify a realistic and consistent approach to claims 
to victimhood. Although step-by-step guidelines about how to approach 
victimhood are impractical, I hope to propose general guidance which will reduce 
the disparate responses towards victims and claims of victimhood.  
 Firstly, I suggest that we should seek for a victim, or a Potential Victim, to 
be treated fairly. We are looking to identify a real-world solution, so I do not 
propose that we approach this from a state akin to Rawls’ Original Position 
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(1999), because it is important to acknowledge and include knowledge of the 
existing realities of our society in this consideration. Complete justice and 
absolute fairness live alongside the ‘safety utopia’; desirable but unattainable. I 
propose instead that we consider that each and any one of us could become a 
victim, and that we start with this premise: “people are dignified agents, but they 
are also, frequently, victims” (Nussbaum, 2001: 406). 
 Victimhood should not be seen as an attribute or characteristic that certain 
people, or certain types of people possess, but a state that any of us, and indeed 
many of us, enter into as a result of experiencing harm. Equally, becoming or 
being recognised as a victim does not negate our agency, the two are not 
incompatible (Ibid.). We have seen that, in cases where victims are considered 
to have less agency than other people, they can be disempowered, having 
choices made which directly impact them, without their consultation or consent; 
but they can also be over-empowered, their voice given more power than another 
member of society as a result of their victim-status, for example, being 
automatically believed, or their behaviour and actions placed beyond scrutiny, as 
if they could not have acted otherwise.  
 In order to avoid either disempowering or over-empowering those we 
identify as victims, we must both recognise the harms they have experienced, but 
simultaneously recognise them as agents. This means treating people with 
compassion, and providing the right levels of support and information to allow 
them to make informed decisions for themselves, while continuing to 
acknowledge that if, when armed with all the information and opportunities open 
to them, that individual makes a choice which we consider to be ‘unwise’, this 
decision should still be respected, accepted and supported. As agents, we have 
the right to make decisions which may be considered unwise to others, but we 
must also expect to be considered responsible for the decision that we make. 
The freedom to act in accordance with our own choices inevitably gives us 
ownership over those choices.  
Cavalieri provides an example of how this pro-support and pro-choice 
approach can work in practise with her ‘third way’ feminism. Cavalieri (2011: 
1445) seeks to find a middle-way between the “dominance” feminist approach to 
sex work, which she believes “mutes the voices” of those sex workers who 
consider that sex work has some “liberatory purpose”, and the liberal feminist 
approach which contrastingly focuses too closely on individuals and does not 
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address the societal structures and systematic oppression of women. Cavalieri’s 
approach encourages Rescuer/Recogniser intervention for sex workers, which 
provides information and resources, giving women the opportunity to overcome 
the power differentials, which can only be understood through perceiving 
oppressions from a wider social perspective, but catering each intervention to the 
individual’s situation (Ibid.). Through this approach, individual agentic choice is 
not overlooked, and while a good understanding of the existence of oppressions 
and limitations on women’s choices in these situations is key, this understanding 
will assist in ensuring that the right information and resources are offered to the 
individual, while still recognising the unique experience of the individual and her 
situation. Through providing the knowledge and resources, the choice of how to 
oppose the oppression she faces remains with individual women, and allows for 
agentic action (Ibid.).  
 
5.i. Our responsibility as members of society 
 
Individuals need to take responsibility for their actions, as agents, and this is the 
case both for victims and for potential victims. As argued in Section 4, while 
responsibility for harm sits with the perpetrator of harm, some responsibility for 
risk of vulnerability to harm must reside with each agent, who can choose to act 
in ways which can reduce or heighten their risk. However, as a society we must 
also take some collective responsibility for the safety of individuals within our 
society. It is not enough to simply react to harm, punishing perpetrators and 
recognising victims. There needs to be proactive measures implemented to 
prevent harm and to protect potential victims. In order to present victims and 
potential victims with the appropriate resources and information to allow them to 
make their own agentic choices, there is a need to proactively understand the 
risks they face, and this will include analysis of previous harms experienced by 
members of our society, including factors which caused increased vulnerability. 
This demonstrates the necessity of examination of victim-behaviour prior to harm. 
In addition to a person-centred approach when dealing with individual victims, as 
members of a society we must also be aware of and tackle the wider overarching 
issues within our society which make harm more likely. As Cavalieri (2011) 
promotes in her approach, simply providing opportunities for independent agentic 
action on a case-by-case basis is insufficient; we must look at the wider picture 
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and also focus our efforts on larger scale interventions by influencing law and 
public policy. 
 As members of society, it is possible to both hold individuals accountable; 
perpetrators for harm, victims for their actions, and also consider our own 
responsibility for creating a safer society. However, analysis of harms and the 
sharing of information about how to avoid harm could be perceived as parental, 
and counter to respect for people as agents. Further, focus upon existing 
vulnerability to harm has been viewed as perpetuating and normalising 
systematic harms. The focus on women as vulnerable to sexual assault, and the 
resulting plethora of rape avoidance literature, has been perceived as rendering 
sexual violence against women as inevitable and unavoidable, encouraging 
women to see themselves as “always vulnerable” (Campbell, 2005: 121), and to 
“wallow” in a victim state (Friedan, 1998: 245). This is often considered to both 
normalise sexual violence rather than discouraging it, and at the same time to 
control women by limiting their freedoms and autonomy by emphasising and 
perhaps even exaggerating the danger they face in public, and therefore 
constraining their movement through personal fear of harm (Campbell 2005, 
Naffine 1998, Warr 1985; Gardner 1990).  
 In contrast, awareness and knowledge of risks, and advice on how to lower 
risk, can be seen as liberating and allowing for increased autonomy. Risk 
assessment is not about eliminating risk entirely, but about identifying and 
managing risk, and adapting to reach desired outcomes with the minimal risk. 
Knowledge of strategies to avoid harm are considered to be beneficial in 
supporting survivors of sexual assault moving forward by helping to develop 
personal agency and a sense of safety (Herman, 2015).  Accepting that we are 
each vulnerable to victimhood does not deny us our dignity or agency. There is 




The ideal response to a claim to victimhood should seek to empower the 
individual by providing support, information and resources, providing the 
opportunity for agentic action, while allowing space for the individual to act in 
accordance with their own will, and in reaction to individual circumstances. How 
this offer of support looks should be considered on a case-by-case basis, but will 
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be guided by a knowledge base which is built upon proactive research and 
awareness of past and existing harms, on both macro and micro scales. Policies 
such as the no-drop policy should not be applied generically, but should be a 
considered option if it is thought to be in the best interest of both the individual 
victim and the public. Such policies should be used only when full rationale is 
provided.  
 This approach can only work when employed hand in hand with larger 
scale interventions which seek to balance power and target systematic harms by 
influencing legislation, public policy to create a fairer and safer society, with 
education which creates awareness for would-be and actual perpetrators of 
harm, and with punishment for those who perpetrate harm. In pursuing these 
aims, we help to create a fairer and safer society which allows for increased 
opportunity of agentic action for victims, and which reduces the necessity for 
proactive and defensive action from individuals to limit their risk of vulnerability to 
harm.  
 The ideal response will be based upon the understanding that an individual 
being recognised as a ‘victim’ tells us only that this is a person who has been 
harmed, but we cannot make any further assumptions about this person from 
their victim status alone. Each and every member of our society is vulnerable to 
experiencing harm, and thus, experiencing ‘victimhood’. The fact that someone 
has been harmed does not simultaneously inform us of anything about that 
individual’s ability to make decisions about their own safety; agency and 
victimhood are not mutually exclusive. This perspective can be achieved when 
we employ compassion; Nussbaum (2001: 414) states that compassion provides 
a “motive to secure to all the basic support that will undergird and protect human 
dignity.” To be more specific about how this approach can work in relation to 
empirical examples, let us examine this in relation to some previous examples 
already raised. 
 
5.iii. A policy of automatically believing claims of victimhood 
 
In Section 1, an ongoing dispute about the use of the words ‘victim’ and 
‘complainant’ was introduced. The argument centres around the appropriateness 
of timing of the use of the word ‘victim’, which suggests that someone has been 
harmed, often before it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that their 
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account of events is true. Both parties in this dispute seemed to agree that using 
the word ‘victim’ to describe someone who came forward with a report of 
experiencing harm suggested that their account was believed. Some parties felt 
this was the appropriate course of action (Bailey), and others felt this was 
assuming the guilt of the accused despite having an existing system which 
assumes the innocence of the accused (Henriques and Hare). 
What sort of response will be generated when applying a compassionate 
approach? A compassionate approach needs to take into consideration both the 
potential victim and the potentially falsely-accused. I propose that a neutral term 
can be employed, between ‘victim’, which suggests belief in the guilt of the 
accused, and ‘complainant’, which carries with it negative connotations such as 
complaining, moaning or whining (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020c). The word 
‘reporter’ represents a neutral concept, which suggests provision of an account 
of an event which could equally be true or false. I suggest that a reporter who 
comes forward to provide an account to the Police should not be automatically 
believed, but should automatically be considered credible; not believed, but 
believable. Both the reporter and the accused person should be assured of a 
thorough and objective investigation to establish all available facts, and the 
opportunity to provide their own account. Both parties will be provided with 
support and all appropriate information which allows them to understand the 
processes, and the options available to them at each stage. Both accounts of 
events, if contradictory, should be considered equally credible until such a time 
as there is sufficient evidence collated to suggest otherwise. While it is 
contradictory to say that both accounts are believed to be true, it is not 
contradictory to assume that both accounts are credible. 
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In terms of the Victim-Power Triangle, this would be represented as follows: 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V2 x C3 = P6 
Alleged Perpetrator: V2 x C3 = P6 
 
 
The Rescuer/Recogniser is credible because they do not make assumptions 
about who is more or less likely to be telling the truth based on personal biases, 
but they do acknowledge that both parties are credible. Any consequent 
investigations following an account being provided by the ‘reporter’ will be 
evidence-based and objective. The Rescuer/Recogniser has a stronger voice 
than the Potential Victim and Alleged Perpetrator because it is the 
Rescuer/Recogniser who holds the power to recognise a person as a victim, and 
it is the Rescuer/Recogniser who decides when the investigation is complete. 
Both the Potential Victim and Alleged Perpetrator are to be considered credible, 
able to be believed. The playing field is even. They do not, however, have much 
influence over the direction of the investigation. 
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5.iv. The ‘victimless’ prosecution 
 
In certain circumstances the duty to both support the victim and increase 
opportunity for agentic action, the duty to implement policy which protects the 
public from risk of harm, and the duty to punish the perpetrator may appear to 
conflict. For example, faced with all the relevant information and options available 
to them, a victim of domestic abuse may wish to make the decision to withdraw 
a statement they have made to the Police, and to return to their partner. However, 
it may be considered that the perpetrator of harm poses such a risk to the victim, 
and to the public, that measures must be put in place to prevent the perpetrator 
from contacting the victim, and that legal proceedings against the perpetrator 
must continue. In these circumstances, the victim may feel that they have had 
their right to make a choice taken away from them, however, this lack of choice 
more accurately demonstrates a limitation on the choices and freedoms of the 
perpetrator. The victim has been free to withdraw their support for the 
prosecution, but this may not mean the prosecution is not pursued nonetheless. 
While efforts should be made to support and facilitate a victim’s choices with 
regard to their own future, this does not extend to an overriding of normal legal 
and judicial processes relating to perpetrators of harm. A victim is empowered to 
make choices about their own life, not given the power to make choices about 
processes which do not directly relate to them. The punishment of an offender 
may at times be counter to the wishes of a victim, but to allow the victim to decide 
whether a member of society should face punishment for an action which is 
counter to legislation, and to deny judicial process which is in the public interest, 
is to give the victim’s voice an overly heightened authority.  
 A compassionate approach here will seek to provide appropriate 
emotional and legal support to all parties, throughout the process. The unique 
person-centred support provided to the victim or potential victim will take into 
account the individual circumstances of the case, and combine this with the 
understanding obtained from awareness of wider, over-arching societal issues, 
and learning from previous cases, to give space for the opportunity for agentic-
action. This will depend on the unique circumstances, but could include 
counselling for the victim and offender, education courses, support with safety 
planning, or financial support to enable independence and prevent dependence 
upon the perpetrator from being a factor preventing the victim from leaving, 
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should they wish to. Therefore, a compassionate approach will not support a 
generic policy, such as the no-drop policy, to be applied to all cases, but an 
evidence-based prosecution could be pursued if it is deemed that prosecution of 
the offender is the best course of action in the public interest. 
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V2 x C3 = P6 
Alleged Perpetrator: V1 x C3 = P3 
 
 
Again, the Rescuer/Recogniser is credible because they are knowledgeable of 
the over-arching social issues relating to power dynamics between victims and 
perpetrators, but also consider the unique case in question, and its individual 
complexities. They seek to arrive at the best outcome, balancing public interest 
with the victim’s safety, and punitive measures for those who have acted in 
contradiction with the law. 
In this case too, the Rescuer/Recogniser has a stronger voice than the 
Potential Victim and Alleged Perpetrator because it is the Rescuer/Recogniser 
who holds the power to recognise victim status, and it is the Rescuer/Recogniser 
who has the power to make decisions about investigation and judicial process. 
Both the Potential Victim and Alleged Perpetrator are to be considered credible, 
able to be believed. However, in this instance the Potential Victim’s voice is 
comparatively stronger than the Alleged Perpetrator since the Potential Victim’s 
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views may have some bearing on the proceedings, where the Alleged Perpetrator 
is unlikely to have much influence.   
 
5.v. Tenuous claims to victimhood 
 
We have seen that the state of victimhood can at times bring with it credibility, 
trust, sympathy, protection, and power over others, (Williams 2008, Minow 1993, 
Weeks and Johnson 1980), and that this status can even render a person’s 
actions beyond criticism. As a result, people can seek recognition as a victim in 
order to obtain these approvals, sometimes without a genuine claim or 
experience. 
 We know that causing wrongful harm is not always a legal matter; there 
may be no investigation, no proof or opportunity for both sides to put forward their 
account. This means that there is opportunity for any individual to make a claim 
of victimhood, and to receive some degree of sympathy, and added credibility 
without having experienced a corresponding harm.  
 In cases where victim’s actions are placed beyond evaluation, where their 
voice has an amplified power due to their victim status, it is quite apparent why 
we, as a society, would not want those with no legitimate claim to access these 
advantages. However, when victims are no longer over-empowered, but are 
instead empowered, met with compassion, while being recognised as agents 
whose actions are not beyond scrutiny, fraudulent or tenuous claims to 
victimhood will be less appealing. Recognition as a victim will only be beneficial 
to genuine victims who seek support and empowerment. An individual who 
reports a false allegation, either formally through the authorities, or informally 
through other outlets, would not be automatically believed, and this will protect 
the wellbeing of, and represent compassion towards the accused, who could be 
a victim of a false allegation. At the same time, the reporter and potential victim 
will be considered credible, believable, but not automatically believed. This 
represents a compassionate view on both sides, and neither party are 
disempowered or over-empowered. The potential victim will be offered support to 
access the choices available to them, but they will still be treated as an agent. 
The ‘victim’ title may present them with additional opportunities and access to 
support that would not otherwise be available to them, but this would not be 
advantageous to any individual who is entirely falsifying a claim to victimhood, as 
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this support, such as counselling, advocacy or enabling services will only benefit 
someone who is in need of this support.  
 
Rescuer/Recogniser: V3 x C3 = P9 
Potential Victim: V2 x C3 = P6 




A compassionate approach acknowledges that anyone can be a victim. By 
respecting victims as agents, and acknowledging the credibility of their account, 
we can ensure that the act of labelling someone as a victim will neither diminish 
their ability to do things with their speech, nor apply to it any special status which 
would over-empower this individual. This allows for examination of victim-
behaviour without victim-blaming.  
A compassionate approach allows for fairness for the victim, the potential 
victim and the accused party. Using the term ‘reporter’ places the potential victim 
in a position between ‘victim’ and ‘complainant’, while leaving the perpetrator in 
a position to provide an equally credible defence. 
With regard to the issue of the different connotations assigned to ‘victim’ 
throughout society, there is no single way to resolve the wide variations in the 
use or understanding of the connotations of this word. If the word is used 
negatively, it will be associated with negative ideas, and consequently used to 
convey negative ideas. However, if a compassionate and empowering approach 
Power balance represented by compassion in the face of tenuous claims to victimhood 
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to victimhood is adopted by those who have authority in a relevant field, e.g. 
police and legal professionals, the use of the ‘victim’ label will begin to take on a 
more neutral association insofar as positive and negative connotations are 
concerned. If victim status is no longer associated with gaining power, being 
disempowered, or indicating that a person is less powerful than others, and is 
used by those with relevant authority simply to label a person who is recognised 
as having been wrongfully harmed, this could become the predominant meaning 
of the word. When used by people with relevant authority, it is likely that the 
perlocutionary effect would be to influence the understanding and the use of the 
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